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ABSTRACT

Ringelberg, Josiah M. M.S., Purdue University, August 2016. Mergers And Acquisitions In
Food And Agribusiness: Returns, Drivers, And Long Run Performance: Major Professors:
Michael Gunderson. Michael Boehlje.

Food and agribusiness in the U.S is a dynamic and ever changing business. The
industry has seen booms and busts, considerable consolidation, and continued
globalization in the past few decades. Businesses operating within its sectors have had


 



  

    

consolidates at

the consumer, supplier, and producer level. One strategy companies have used to grow
and position themselves throughout years of industry consolidation has been merger
and acquisition (M&A) transactions.
During the eleven years from 1985 and 1995, the food industry was listed in the
top 10 M&A most active industries ten times. It was counted in the top five for six of
those years (Adelaja et al. 1999). This highlights the significance M&A has played in food
and agribusiness. Despite the prevalence of M&A, there exists much dispute on the
value of it, and whether it is beneficial to shareholders at all. The impact of M&A on


      



   



 



announcement is the focus of this paper.
M&A transactions are analyzed in the short and long run according to the
      

   

   

 

impact is further analyzed using changes in financial performance following a
transaction. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market and market adjusted

xii
normal returns models. Generalized sign z and Patell z statistical tests were used to
analyze cumulative abnormal returns over multiple event windows. The conclusions of
this paper focus on the 0-1 day event window and the calculations are subject to
backdating. Average cumulative abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders were found
to be roughly 1% following a transactions announcement for the 0-1 day event window,
while target shareholders reported a 17% gain. Both results were statistically significant
at the .05 or less level.
Long run buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for acquirers were measured
over the event window -1 to 36 months following a transactions announcement. The
market adjusted model reported a mean loss of 7.6% for acquirer shareholders during
this time period. Detrimental long run performance is further supported by the analysis
of financial metric changes in acquirer firms during the years following a transaction.
Asset turnover, debt to equity, and return on equity were found to be lower on average
in the years following a transaction than prior.
Lastly, OLS regressions were used to examine drivers of abnormal returns.
Acquirer abnormal return regressions report variables reflecting acquirer return on
assets, target return on assets, cash transactions, and transactions in the food and
beverage retailing industry as all statistically significant factors impacting acquirer return.
Coefficients for transactions in food and beverage retailing as well as cash transactions
were positive. Acquirer and target ROA variables had negative coefficients in acquirer
return OLS regressions. Target abnormal return regressions report variables reflecting
cash transactions, hostile transaction, and competitive transactions as all statistically
significant factors impacting returns. The coefficients on these variables were positive.
Short run market and market adjusted model abnormal returns were found to be very
correlated and differ greatly only in long run calculated returns.

1

CHAPTER 1.

1.1

INTRODUCTION TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

Motivation M&A Transactions in the World Today

On December 11, 2015, DuPont and Dow Chemical announced an all-stock
merger of equals. The intention of this merger was to create one large company that
would spin-off three independent companies over the next two years. However, an
  

  

    

         

DuPont shares down 26.8% and Dow Chemical down 24.4% (Neely 2016). Although part
of this decline in value is certainly driven by an economic recession in the industries
within which DuPont and Dow Chemical operate, the overall investor pessimism is
rather surprising given the synergies and strategic benefits of the deal; for example, the
resultant ag focused spinoff of the merger will control over a 40% share of the U.S. corn
seeds and related genetics sector (Neely 2016).
The Dow/DuPont deal is set to change the landscape of certain subsections in
the agricultural industry. Furthermore, this transaction represents only one example of
a slew of mergers and acquisitions that have shaken the food and agribusiness sectors
over the last few years. In addition to the Dow and DuPont transaction, several other
large deals have occurred. The world's largest pork processor and hog producer,
Smithfield Foods, was purchased by the Chinese company Shuanghui International
Holdings in late 2013. Tyson Foods purchased Hillshire Brands in 2014; and less than a
year later consumer food giants Kraft and Heinz announced their own intention to
merge. These transactions foretell of coming changes to the food and agribusiness
sectors, industries which are no strangers to transformation. Merger and acquisition
(M&A) waves have revolutionized and restructured these industries several times in the
last few decades and continue to prompt change and adaption today.
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To gain insight into the importance M&A has had historically, one needs only to
review the transactions that characterize the fourth, fifth, and sixth merger waves 1.
Often times macro events and policy changes precipitate these waves, but regardless of
the factors that initiate them each wave

 



  

  

the food and agribusiness sectors by researchers, businessmen, and investors. For
example, during the eleven years and two waves that span 1985-1995, the food industry
alone was included among the top 10 M&A most active industries ten times. It was
counted in the top five for six of those years (Adelaja et al. 1999).
Mergers and acquisitions act to change industry competition, concentration, and
 

      

 

   



   

commonly used

inorganic and strategic growth method of companies across the globe. Over 44,000
transactions valuing more than 4.5 trillion US dollars were cited worldwide in 2015
alone (IMMA 2016). This has helped establish the field of M&A as a continued interest
of policy makers, academic researchers, investment bankers, accountants, and business
executives.

1.2

Problem Statement

David Fubini, Colin Price, and Maurizio Zollo, the authors of Mergers: Leadership,
Performance, and Corporate Health, identify the goal of every M&A transaction as
rooted in the pursuit of generating or protecting company value. However, many factors
make it difficult to determine in a given M&A transaction the extent to which each of
these goals is accomplished. The ambiguity is exacerbated as various approaches can be




 

      



 





 

 

segment value created from an acquisition and value intrinsic to the original company in
the years surrounding the d
1

  

 

        



Although disputes regarding the existence and length of waves exist, they are largely identified by the
following time periods: first wave, 1893-1904; second wave, 1919-1929; third wave, 1955-1970; fourth
wave, 1974-1989; fifth wave, 1993-2000; sixth wave, 2003-2008; seventh wave, 2011-present.
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differing and even opposing conclusions about the value generation of a merger or
acquisitions can be determined.
Commonly, specific segments or subsets of the larger body of M&A transactions
have been found to be unique or divergent in their average value creation. However,

     

  

   

 

 -creation for

both acquiring and target company shareholders is a contentious debate. Questions
concerning the extent common factors impact value continue. Indeed, some researchers
have questioned whether M&A creates value at all. These inquires have been posed to
general M&A transactions, particular companies, and specific industries.
This paper seeks to provide insights into the problem of ambiguity regarding
whether M&A transactions in the food and agribusiness industry create or destroy value
and evaluate the extent to which attributes like relative size, deal value, and industry
influence the returns of target and acquirer shareholders. Long run performance
changes of acquirers are also examined. Specifically, transactions will be assessed using
shareholder returns for the acquiring and target companies. Normal return models are
compared with realized returns to isolate the impact of a transactions announcement.
The analysis conducted seeks to capture both the short and long run impact of M&A
transactions to shareholder interests as well as provide insight into the long run
performance of acquirers. Given the complex nature of mergers and acquisitions, the
dynamic nature of the food and agribusiness sectors, and the strong precedents of prior
research in the field of M&A, an overview of company valuation approaches, historical
industry and sector idiosyncrasies, and established methods of M&A analysis is provided
in Chapter 2  the literature review.

1.3

Hypotheses & Stages of Analysis

The goal of this paper is to explore the value created by mergers and acquisitions
in the agriculture, food and beverage, food and beverage retailing, and tobacco
industries. Two normal return models are used to analyze the impact M&A transaction

4
announcements have on investor returns of acquiring and target companies. Company
returns are examined over long and short event windows and tested for significance.
Individual company returns are later regressed upon to elicit and quantify driving
influencers of value. An examination of long run changes in performance of acquirers is
included to supplement shortcomings of long run abnormal return analysis. Figure 1
displays a broad outline of the processes and steps through which the conclusions of
this paper are obtained. Four main stages or processes are identified in development of
the final conclusions reached in this study. The stages are as follows: stage 1, data
collection processes; stage 2, event study and abnormal return calculations; stage 3, OLS
regressions; and stage 4, long run acquirer performance analysis. Each section builds on
the prior conclusions of the previous stage or is used to justify the approaches and
analysis of later sections. Several distinct hypotheses have been identified and the
analysis of this paper will focus specifically on them. The hypotheses have been grouped
according to the stages and chapter within which they are addressed. A comprehensive
analysis of all hypotheses and the general conclusions of this paper is provided in the
conclusion of this paper  Chapter 8.
Stage 2, Chapter 5: Testing Presence of Abnormal Returns
Hypothesis 1: Average abnormal returns in the short run are zero for acquiring firms

        
Hypothesis 2: Acquirer subsets will not vary in the short run reported average returns
according to the relative size, value, and industry characteristics of the transaction.
Hypothesis 3: Average abnormal returns in the short run are zero for target firms after a

     
Hypothesis 4: Target subsets will not vary in the short run reported average returns
according to the relative size, value, and industry characteristics of the transaction.
Hypothesis 5: Average abnormal returns in the long run are zero for acquiring firms after

      
Hypothesis 6: Acquirer subsets will not vary in the long run reported average returns
according to the relative size, value, and industry characteristics of the transaction.

5
Stage 3, Chapter 6: Testing Significance of Drivers of Abnormal Return
Hypothesis 7: Acquirer abnormal returns are not significantly impacted by industry.
Hypothesis 8: Acquirer and target abnormal returns are not significantly impacted by
relative size of the transaction.
Hypothesis 9: Acquirer and target abnormal returns are not significantly impacted by
deal value of the transaction.
Hypothesis 10: Acquirer and target abnormal returns are not significantly impacted
when the transac  



 

  

Hypothesis 11: Hostile transactions will not have an impact on the returns of targets.
Hypothesis 12: Target abnormal returns are not significantly impacted when multiple
bidders are present.
Stage 4, Chapter 7: Examining Long Run Financial Performance of Acquirers
Hypothesis 13: Acquirer current ratios are decreased in the long run.
Hypothesis 14: Acquirer asset turnover are decreased in the long run.
Hypothesis 15: Acquirer total debt ratios are decreased in the long run.
Hypothesis 16: Acquirer return on equity are decreased in the long run.
These hypotheses are posed with the intent of providing clarity while building on
prior literature and foundational economic principles. For example, the first hypothesis
that M&A transactions create value for acquirers is built off the notion that the
occurrence of M&A transactions and the assumption companies operate rationally
imply M&A transactions must be more likely to benefit the acquirer. Were this not the
         

 !  "

destroy value, but rather there is more opportunity than risk incentivizing the
occurrence of M&A transactions. The next hypothesis, hypothesis 2, is included to
examine whether the opportunity and risk associated with transactions vary according
to particular attributes. Different market sectors may vary in their structure and have
inherently unique risks which may interact with the returns experienced by acquirer or
target firms. Deals of larger value or relative size may also alter the risk and return of

6
the parties involved. These notions have been supported by prior studies and are
further elaborated upon in the literature review.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are similar to the first two, but focus on analyzing the
experience of target firm shareholders. Unlike acquirers, it is far more likely that these
firms should experience significant returns as acquirers should often have to incentivize
participation with a premium. Although a premium or positive return may be strongly
expected as target firms do not bear many of the risks in a transaction, questions
regarding the significance of such returns prompts the third hypothesis. Hypothesis 4
mirrors hypothesis 2 in its inquiry into the returns of different market segments or
transaction groups of target firms.
The last two hypotheses in the stage 2 section explore the long run experiences
of acquiring firm investors. Similar to hypotheses 1 & 2 or 3 & 4, these hypotheses
examine the general returns of acquirer sub segments in the long run. They are unique,
however, as they include adjustments to stock prices following the actual transaction
instead of just the announcement. The returns, thus, measure in part the actual impact
of a transaction rather than just the markets speculation following a transactions
announcement.
Hypotheses 7-12 of stage three rely on the results of OLS regressions. These
regressions are discussed in the methodology section, but the variables included in
them are used to test and quantify the impact certain drivers have on abnormal returns
experienced by shareholders. The dependent variable regressed upon are the returns
calculated for each transaction in stage 2. Because they are built upon each other, the
conclusions of stage 2 hypotheses influence the credibility of the conclusions of stage 3.
The last four hypotheses act to supplement the long run analysis of acquirer
returns. The models and approaches used to calculate abnormal returns lose much of
their power in long run analysis. This will be further discussed in the literature review,
but the analysis of changing performance metrics in firms that participate in M&A
transactions allows for new insights and an additional viewpoint of the impact M&A

7
transactions have on acquirers. These hypotheses do not however, lend themselves to
statistical testing and are analyzed graphically.

8

Figure 1: Flow Chart Outline of Paper
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1.4

Conclusion

This paper seeks to elaborate on current perceptions of mergers and acquisition
in the context of food and agribusiness. Recent consolidation trends and market
restructuring has brought M&A in these industries into the spotlight. However, research
papers into the particular returns of acquirers and targets specific to this industry are
limited. The ideas expressed in this paper are intended to help cultivate a better
understanding of these returns in researchers and businessmen alike.
Sixteen hypotheses are listed, but the insights provided are not limited to the
conclusions of these inquiries. Many trends or unexpected characteristics arise
throughout the progression of the paper and, depending on their applicability, are
addressed. Others are left for future researchers to explore. As with all research, there
exist limitations to the models, approaches, and analyses of this paper and these
limitations are address and conveyed as clearly as possible to the reader throughout the
paper.
Lastly, analysis and hypotheses addressed in this paper are chosen for their
applicability to the papers intended readers. Multiple approaches are used to maximize
the accuracy of the conclusions listed. Ideally, this paper will provide a foundation for
those without prior knowledge of the role of M&A and new insights to those with a
mastery of the field. The next section will elaborate on the findings of prior studies and
academic perception of M&A in food, agribusiness, and in general.

10

CHAPTER 2.

2.1

LITERATURE REVIEW

Valuation processes, Markets and Event Studies

There are four predominant methods for company valuation: discounted cash
flow valuation, liquidation and accounting valuation, relative valuation, and contingent
claim valuation 

 

       

and the difficulties that must be overcome calculating this value is itself an area of study
which has garnered a significant amount of research. Furthermore, the continued
debate between             
           

difficult task2. Multiple processes through which investors calculate a  
are discussed in this paper, but most analysis conducted places the task of valuing the
companies studied on the market. It does this by using stock price data surrounding the
    

    

the views of financial

markets. The assumption of market efficiency is implicit. Even so, the common valuation
approaches are reviewed as markets are driven according to the valuation conclusions
of investors using the approaches outlined in the following paragraphs.
The approaches used by a researcher to measure worth or value of a company
are important because the method employed can greatly impact the results concluded.
Without an accurate method to determine the initial value of a company and its posttransaction value, no meaningful inferences can be drawn from the transaction. If the
method is not comprehensive -- capable of capturing the multitude of factors that drive
profits and subsequently value -- the insights of the study will be limited. In the most

2

!" #!"$ %&'!"#()%!& !& "(&*!# +(,- ).$!"/ 0$$ 12")!& 3(,-%$,40 0$#%&(, 5678 +!"-

Down Wall Street

A Random Walk
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 finding could provide errant results or a conclusion that does not

accurately reflect the true nature of the transactions studied. Depending on the goals of
a study, a researcher may also need to give consideration to an approach where
changes in worth systemic to the original firm and those driven by the transaction are
clearly separable.

2.1.1 Discounted Cash Flows
Valuation methods attempt to relate value to the level of uncertainty
surrounding expected future cash flows. This is most clearly seen in the discounted cash
flows method. Quite simply, this approach claims the value of an asset should be the
present value of the expected cash flows of the asset discounted back at a rate that
reflects the riskiness of each cash flow. This approach is widely praised but requires the
estimation of future cash flows for a company, a somewhat arduous and speculative
task.

2.1.2 Liquidation and Accounting Valuation
Liquidation and accounting valuation are primarily driven by the notion that a
business is comprised of assets and the value of the assets should sum to the value of
the business. This approach works well for large established businesses in developed
markets where growth opportunities are not readily available. The shortcoming in this
method comes from the fact that many investors ascribe value to the potential for
growth in both a company and its cash flows. This potential for growth may involve
factors and investments not shown on a balance sheet. As Damodaran (2006) states,

12
  

   

  



-based valuations will yield

lower values than going concern valuations3

2.1.3 Relative Valuation
Relative valuation involves the valuation of an asset based on how comparable


        







     



market pricing of similar stocks. Often times financial ratios pertaining to variables like
     

     

 

   

     

true value. Damodaran (2006) again identifies three steps to relative valuation: finding
comparable assets that are priced by the market, scaling the market prices to a common
variable, and adjusting for differences across assets.
Liu, Nissim and Thomas (2002) provide insights into the accuracy and
employment of common multiples in pricing over 19,000 firm-year observations
spanning seventeen years following 1982. They identify multiples capturing forecasted
earnings per share perform best in explaining pricing differences, while sales multiples
suffer inaccuracy. It should be noted that if the market is correct in its pricing of stocks,
discounted cash flow and re           
derived. Lastly, most valuations are considered to fall under the classification of a
relative valuation. Damodaran (2002) notes that almost 90% of equity research
valuations and 50% of acquisition valuations rely on inferences drawn from multiples
and comparable companies. They are thus relative valuations. This claim is not extended
to academic research on the impact of M&A, but rather the speculative processes by
which transaction deal values are negotiated in the market.

3

Going concern value is the value of a business that is expected to continue operating into the future as
opposed to the value of its liquidated assets.
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2.1.4 Contingent Claim Valuation
The last method, contingent claim valuation, uses option pricing models to
measure the value of assets that share option characteristics. This method and the
models employed in it has arguably seen the most development in recent years
following the Black-Scholes pricing model in 1973. However, it is an approach not widely
used in the analysis of M&A. Contingent claim valuation has been mainly praised for its
ability to better model companies given particular circumstances. For example,
Damodaran (2006) suggests     

   

 

   

blockbuster cancer drug wending its way through the FDA approval process cannot be
   

           It may more aply

be described using contingent claim analysis. Despite this, contingent claim valuation
use in the general M&A analysis is minimal as other approaches have been preferred by
academia and industry alike.

2.1.5 Stock Price Adjustments and Market Efficiency
Literature regarding M&A transactions can outsource the valuation process by
assuming market efficiency and accuracy. This is perhaps the most common practice in
academic research. Using the prices of public company stocks following the
announcement of an M&A transaction, researchers can gain insight into the perceived
value generation investors believe will occur. This is usually done through the use of an
event study. The event study methodology is largely built on a foundational paper
authored by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll in 1969. Their work, titled The Adjustment of
Stock Prices to New Information, focuses on common stock price adjustment following
the release of information regarding a stock split. Implicitly, event study methodology is
heavily influenced by capital market perceptions of value. The realized or actual impact
of an event is assumed to be encoded in the price changes of a stock after the event is
  

               

market value accurately according to the information available to investors. It is
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investors, then, who utilize valuation techniques and the open market to determine a

      

     

Event study methodology has been used to analyze the impact of many kinds of
informational releases in addition to M&A related events. Pivotal to an event study

   

 

  

       

    



occurred had the event not happened. It is with the normal returns estimated by a
normal returns model that abnormal returns, returns not prompted by ordinary market

    

        

    

methodology, its application in M&A research, and its use in this paper are further
discussed in section 2.4 and Chapter 4.

2.2

Food and Agribusiness M&A

Given the number of M&A transactions in the food and agribusiness industry
during the last few M&A waves, there have been a number of publications concerning
the state and future of M&A in agriculture. Several unique characteristics of the food
and agribusiness industries have been historical driving factors of M&A and the focus of
many publications. The food and agribusiness sectors, particularly the agribusiness
sector, are prone to cyclical boom and bust periods. These periods can lead to changes
in farm income, land values, and financial structuring as farmers adjust how they fund
their projects. Cash flush periods for farmers can lead to similar prosperity for those
who supply products and services for farmers, and this in turn can lead to industry
conditions that prompt M&A activity.

 



        

 

      

develop cash flush periods suggest they should be viewed as a separable entity from
other M&A literature. This flushness is often most visible in company free cash flows. By
definition, free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that
have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital (Jenson
1986). This surplus of cash flow and its relation to M&A has led to the development of
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the free cash flow theory of takeovers. The theory presented is motivated by the idea
that cash flush companies may be prone to participate in M&A due to managerial rather
than shareholder interests. This can cause a significant agency cost -- a cost born by
hiring an entity to act on behalf of shareholders -- occurs through M&A because
common managerial interests may not align with what is optimal for shareholders. This
theory also aligns with the general perception that M&A destroys value for acquirers.
 

     

          

allocation of excess funds. Managers may prioritize company growth in order to benefit
from increased personal power and compensation instead of returning excess cash to
investors (Jenson 1986). This incentive to grow can lead to value destroying pursuits. As
Jenson states regarding his observations of business practices in th   

Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over [dividend]
payout policies are especially severe when the organization generates
substantial free cash flow. The problem is how to motivate managers to
disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or
wasting it on organization inefficiencies.
         

      

 

mergers also appear to reflect the expenditure of free cash flow. The industry
apparently generates large cash flows with few growth opportunities (    !"#
Likewise, an article published in the New York Times identifies tobacco, forestry, food,
and oil as industries where large free cash flows and agency problems were prophesied
to lead to an increase in takeovers and overall industry restructuring (Jenson B 1986).
A more general perspective of the motives for M&A transactions in the food
industry is provided by Goldberg (1983). He suggests M&A transactions are driven by
factors relating to size, growth, economies of scale, profitability, market share, market
power, synergy, diversification, tax incentives, and managerial hubris. Specifically
concerning the transactions of the fourth wave during the 1980  Declerk (1992)
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suggests that managerial and operational synergy motivations can be main drivers. This

    

        

       

food sector.
Lastly, the overall continuous consolidation of food and agribusiness firms in the
last few decades has not gone unnoted. Publications covering the consolidation process
may not strictly focus on M&A as it relates to the consolidation phenomenon, but the
overall structural change it has impacted on sub-sectors comprising the food and
agribusiness industries have been noted. There is no doubt M&A has worked as a vessel
to facilitate this change. This claim is evidenced by Marion and Kim (1991) who show
mergers and acquisitions played a major role in the concentration of six selected food
industries. They identify M&A as the causal agent for two-thirds of the increase in fourfirm concentration between 1977 and 1988. This consolidation as well as the role of
M&A is recognized also by Boehlje (2002) and exemplified in his observations regarding
the concentration of production to a limited number of firms in the food processing,
food retailing, ag machine, and poultry industries  often with five or less companies
controlling a lion share of the market.
Firm level data has been used to analyze and predict the role companies play in
larger, macro trend phenomenon. For example, research has been done to identify the
firm level factors that influence the likelihood for a company to be targeted and taken
over (Adelaja et al. 1999). Adelaja and his co-authors use public firm data to suggest
that firm liquidity, debt or leverage, profitability, sales growth, stock earnings capacity,
and market-to-book ratio are all important factors in determining the likelihood that a
firm is pursued as a M&A takeover target. Additional findings of their research suggest
that the attitude surrounding the transaction, number of prior bids, and degree of
officer control are important factors to whether a takeover is successful. The two
models presented in their publication reported a 74.5 and 62.9% accuracy, indicative



  

    

   

     

Firm level data has also been used to examine the changes to shareholder value
of food and agribusiness companies following a transaction. Declerck (1992) found
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acquiring firm shareholders to have marginal benefits while target firms in high
concertation food industry segments could earn up to 9% above normal returns and a
15% premium on market price due to accquirer efficiency and market power gains
prompted by the transaction.
Agricultural biotechnology mergers and their impact on competition are
examined using two large scale mergers and event study methodology in King, Wilson,
and Naseem (2002). The two transactions were selected and analyzed with the intent of
providing insight and motivation toward biotechnology industry consolidation that

      

           

return according to the market model to one firm and a positive abnormal return to the
other. Overall, the paper focuses more on the competitive nature and impact M&A can
have on a consolidated industry as a whole, particularly when an industry is dominated
by several large firms.

2.3

Impacts of M&A on Acquirers vs Targets

2.3.1 Acquirer Impact Summary
There are a number of publications that seek to determine the question of
whether M&A transactions provide benefits to acquiring firms on average. Although
intuition would suggest that the acquiring firms must benefit or M&A would not occur,
the empirical evidence largely, though not exclusively, suggest that M&A transactions
destroy value for acquiring shareholders. This is supported by Kengelbach and Roos
(2011) of the Boston Consulting Group who studied approximately 26,000 transactions
completed between 1988 and 2010 and found acquirers to most often have slightly
negative returns following the announcement of an acquisition. An article published in
the Harvard Business Review states the failure rate of acquisition in most studies is
between 70 and 90% (Christenson et. al. 2011). One possible reason for the poor
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success rate has been di

 





   

 

theory and agency problems in the prior section.
It is important to remember that many factors can drive the returns experienced
by acquiring shareholders. The goal of an acquirer -- to generate more value than cost
incurred during a transaction  is very ambitious and bears the risk in a transaction since
most of the value generation hinges on the uncertain predictions made by the acquirer.
Commonly, researchers will try to find trends by grouping acquirers of similar size,
industry, or nationality. Likewise, transactions are often broken down by specific
characteristics such as target to acquirer relative size, cross border classification, and
method of payment by acquirer. Different sub-segments of the overall body of M&A
transactions have been found to have varying returns. Several key studies and their
findings regarding acquirer returns are discussed below and showcase how particular
acquirers have surpassed the odds and generated value using M&A.
A study by Gao & Sudarsanam (2003) found M&A transactions create value for
the acquirers observed. Specifically, Sudarsanam & Gao found that high tech
acquisitions can be value creating for both parties when transactions are constrained to
high tech firms. The authors, however, do acknowledge that high tech acquisition firms
in the years they studied (1990s) largely underperformed industry peers and
comparably sized companies who shared similar book-to-market ratios. They provide
additional information regarding less quantitative components of M&A analysis by
highlighting a negative relationship between managerial shareholdings and postacquisition performance in the high tech sector. This brings to light the increasingly
popular notion that non-financial factors like managerial hubris and human error
prompt or motivate bad transactions. They conclude their analysis by finding that high
managerial ownership reduces risk aversion and can lead to overinvestment when
acquiring an industry related company.
A second pivotal paper showcases both an uncommon, accounting based
analysis approach as well as suggests that high value transactions are different in the
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returns they provide to acquirers. Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) analyze the postacquisition perfo

      



            -tax

operating cash flow scaled by total asset to measure performance. Their analysis, which
compared the performance of the combined post-merger firm to the sum of the
acquiring and target firm prior to the transaction showed a significant post-merger
performance increase. According to their analysis, 70% of firms showed above-average
performance. Also identified was a strong relationship between stock return and
realized cash flow returns.
Lastly, size and market structure seem to be influential factors to acquirer
returns. Kim and Singal (1993) and Singal (1996) examine airline company mergers in
the USA. Their studies found increased market power and efficiency following an M&A
transaction. Abnormal stock returns were linked to the changes in profitability
experienced by the companies, supporting the view that the stock market anticipated
profit changes. Their publications suggest transactions that impact market structure
provide better returns than general M&A. This study is notable because its results may
be applicable to other capital-intensive, limited competitor product sectors like those in
    

 

          

 

be value generating and value to be tied to relative size of the target to acquirer. They
reported a combined average target and bidder return of 3.5% at the announcement of
an acquisition. Their work analyzed 1,305 firms across 59 identified industries.
Mullheron and Boone also analyzed divestitures in their research and found that such
transactions could also provide positive returns.
!" #  $     s

struggle to create the value needed

to cover premiums paid in M&A transactions. Each transaction is different, however,
and sweeping generalizations cannot capture the circumstance of every deal. Prior
studies and findings should be acknowledged but hesitantly applied in broader contexts.
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2.3.2 Target Impact Summary
The returns to shareholders of target firms are consistently found to be positive
and significant. This makes intuitive sense since the shareholders of a targeted company
must be incentivized to participate in a transaction. This incentive is most clearly seen in
the premium above the traded stock price offered to a public M&A target. The idea that
target companies win in a transaction may not be questioned, but many have sought to
quantify the return and identify drivers of it.
A survey of Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarizes the results of 13 empirical
studies covering transactions from 1956 to 1981. The target 

  



 

analyzed reported abnormal returns of 20-30% around the time of announcement. This
 



  

             

to shareholders during the three days surrounding a targe
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actual drivers of target returns from M&A activities, less intuitive conclusions have been
drawn. For example, poorer performance in targeted banks may lead to higher
abnormal returns for target shareholders following a transactions announcement
(Beitel & Wahrenburg 2002). This may be partly due to the models used to determine
return, but the idea is not outlandish on its own. The notion is that poorly managed
companies may hold greater opportunity for an efficient acquirer. Beitel & Wahrenburg
(2002) suggest the shareholders of targets benefit from the transfer of corporate
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Therefore, poorly run companies are more attractive to acquirers because assets are
underutilized, and this appeal has a tangible impact on target shareholder returns.
Identifying trends in targets of M&A transactions is at least as difficult as
examining acquirers and may in fact be the greater challenge. This is because targets
respond to the offers of an acquirer, and the offer of an acquirer is commonly driven by
factors exogenous to the target. Still, there are certain characteristics like target ROA
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that have been identified to influence target shareholder returns. Furthermore, target
models like the one presented by Adalaja (see the Food and Agribusiness M&A section)
suggest there is a nature or commonality to targets of M&A.

2.4

M&A in Event Study Literature

2.4.1 General Overview of M&A in Event Studies
In the general body of M&A analysis, a particular method deserves extended
focus and discussion. Since the initial emergence of event study methodology, the
number of publications using this analytical approach has increased at a seemingly
exponential rate. Just ten years ago Kothari and Warner (2006), recognized over 500
event studies published during the years 1974 through 2000. They go on to discussed
many of the basics of event study methodology and reaffirmed the idea that much of
the original concepts have not changed since its introduction.
At its core, an event study is the estimated difference in market returns between
what occurred and what would have been experienced had an event not happened.
Using an estimation window4 

   

 





   



to market movements, normal returns of a stock during an event window can be
predicted. The returns can then be compared to the realized returns experienced to
gain insight into the impact of the event. The actual returns experienced less the normal
returns calculated provide the abnormal returns attributed to an event. Graphically, the
event study methodology is captured in Figure 2. Specific normal models and event
window lengths can vary from study to study, but the general event study methodology
is the same. MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) discuss the
origins and breadth of event study particularities. The relation of event studies to tests
4

Estimation Window: a period over which parameters are estimated.
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of market efficiency is reviewed in Fama (1991). Again, it is imperative to understand
that conclusions drawn from event studies using financial data reflect investor
perceptions of financial markets and thus implicitly rely on an assumption of market
efficiency.

Figure 2: Event Study Timeline

2.4.2 Short Run Event Studies
The period length over which an event is analyzed is the most widely used
attribute for segmenting event study publications. Studies are typically designated
either long or short run. Although there is no specific numeric time length separating
short and long run event studies, the general accepted rule is to categorize studies
concerned with periods longer than one year as long-run. This is not to say that others
have not used stricter definitions as contemporary research has had greater access to
more periodic daily or intraday data.
Short run event studies are relatively problem free and straightforward. Many
researchers are quite comfortable with the process of valuing the market reaction to
new information over the short run. It is easy to isolate the effect of a single event on a
   



 



  

        

 

is minimal. Analysis of a transaction becomes increasingly difficult over longer periods of
study. This prompts most researchers to favor short run studies. Simply stated, most
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tests than long-
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most publications

to use data spanning no more than a few months surrounding an event. Thus the
relationship between realized returns and the event in question is clearest. Overall,
event study methodology does not come to drastically different conclusions regarding
the impact of M&A from other analysis methods, but event studies have a particular
advantage in their ability to test numerous firms in an easy, pragmatic manner with
minimal data requirements.
Recent developments and shifts in the conceptual framework of short run event
studies are limited mostly to the emergence of intraday studies in high frequency


 

   

knowledge, data this periodic has not been used to study M&A.

Tests for statistical significance in short run event studies have become more
sophisticated, but this development has had far stronger implications for their long-run
counterparts (Kothari and Warner 2006). Common statistical tests for short run event
studies are presented by Patell (1976) and Cowan (1992). Their standardized cumulative
abnormal return and sign test respectively, have become staples in short run event
study analysis.

2.4.3 Long Run Event Studies
Long-run event studies are subject to much greater concern and have been far
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d Tsai, 1999). This

condemnation is largely driven by several biases and perhaps fatal issues that arise in
long run event studies that are avoidable or negligible in their short run counterparts.
The most notable issue in long run event studies is whether or not the abnormal
returns calculated in an event study can reasonably be tied to the event. Concerns of
whether abnormal returns are driven more by initial mispricing of a stock or the M&A
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transaction observed are not clearly answered. This unpleasant truth is captured by
Kothari and Warner (2006) as they state the following regarding long run studies:

Whether the apparent abnormal returns are due to mispricing, or simply
the result of measurement problems, is a contentious and unresolved issue
among financial economists. The methodological research in the area is
important because it demonstrates how easy it is to conclude there is
abnormal performance when none exists. Before questions on mispricing
can be answered, better methods than currently exist are required.

Furthermore, the possibility that abnormal returns may be driven by mispricing
is made irrelevant if risk adjustment is necessary. Many firms may not be characterized
by a stationary risk factor years after an event. Normal return models that use an
estimation window to calculate a risk beta may not accurately capture the proper
normal returns years after an event. This inaccuracy could cause an inflation in
abnormal returns reported. This is particularly true if the event structurally changes the
risk of the firm. Short run returns are not greatly influenced by an incorrect beta, but
long run analysis using an improper risk estimator can cause substantial flaws. If this
were not enough, a correct risk estimator is still dependent on the validity of the
    

 





  

em highlighted by the statement 







which expected return model is correct, and therefore estimates of abnormal returns
over long horizons are highly sensitive to model 

   

  

Even placing aside these noted issues, there are many more difficulties to
overcome. Long-run studies usually make use of the buy and hold return (BHAR) metric
for determining abnormal returns. The mathematical calculation of this return is
discussed in the methodology section, but it has been argued as the most appropriate
approach for the long run studies because it more closely aligns with the actual
experience of investors (Roll 1983). Furthermore, the BHAR approach avoids biases
arising from security microstructure issues in portfolios subject to frequent rebalancing
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(Blume and Stambaugh 1983) (Roll, 1983). Even so, the buy and hold method is not
without its limitations.
Lyon and Barber (1996) identify the use of long run buy and hold returns as still
subject to new listing, rebalancing, and skewness biases. A new listing bias arises
because abnormal returns of long run event studies must utilize firms with available
long post-event history return data while firms that constitute the portfolio index of
such studies may include new firms that begin trading subsequent to the event. A
rebalancing bias occurs because compound returns of a reference portfolio, such as an
equally weighted market index, are typically calculated assuming periodic rebalancing,
while the returns of sample firms are compounded without rebalancing. Lastly, a
skewness bias occurs because long run abnormal returns are inherently positively
skewed. This is easily understood since stock returns are bounded below by -100% (loss
of all value) but limitless in their potential to generate cumulative positive returns.
Barber and Lyon suggest the use of control firms for detecting long-run abnormal stock
returns. The criteria they use to create a control firm portfolio is dependent on firm size
and book-to-market ratios, and their reported test statistics are well-specified in this
approach. As they note, this setup negates or limits the impact of new listings,
rebalancing, and skewness to some extent, but problems in power still persist.
The problem of long run skewness is further addressed by Arnold R. Cowan and
Anne M. A. Sergeant (1996), who analyze the impact small sample sizes can have on
skewness and returns. They observe many prior publications have used extremely small
sample sizes ranging from 385 to 2216 transactions and merely ignore the presence of
biases. Other publications analyze several thousand transactions and lessen the problem

  

            t suggest the use of

benchmark portfolios that have had their new-listing and rebalancing biases removed.
However, their analysis still finds what they identify as severe misspecification of
5
6

Clark and Ofek 1994
Lakonishok and Vermaelen 1990
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parametric tests caused from skewness. Although they find a negative relationship
between skewness and sample size, their data finds longer time periods increase the
bias experienced. They conclude their paper by suggesting the use of either a two-group
test using winsorized abnormal returns or bootstraping7 to provide well-specified and
more powerful analysis. However, they do acknowledge that bootstrap tests are subject
to detect more negative than positive abnormal returns during analysis.
The fundamental problem with long run event studies is that there are very little
conclusive insights to be found. Their overall power is seemingly trivial even as power
has increased in recent years. A primary example is provided by Jegadeesh and Karceski
(2004) who show that even with an ostensibly large cumulative abnormal returns
performance (25% over 5 years) in a sample of 200 firms, the rejection of the null
hypothesis8 is typically less than 50%. Overall, long run event studies appear to be a
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Normal Return Models

2.5.1 Normal Return Models
Several references have been made to normal return models. In an event study,
a normal return model is used to calculate the expected or normal returns had an event
not occurred. There are multiple models that are commonly used in event study
literature, and each model has its proponents. The three that will be discussed below
are the market adjusted model, market model, and Fama-French three factor model.
Before reviewing these normal return models, a mention should be made of the joint
test problem inherent in all event studies.
7
8

Bootstrapping in a test or metric involves the practice of random sampling with replacement.
that abnormal returns for this period are zero
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In the previous section, it was mentioned that long run event studies are very
sensitive to model choice. This issue captures one implication of the joint test problem.
Put simply, the joint test problem stems from the fact that event studies are not just a
test of whether an event produced abnormal returns, but of whether a particular model
accurately represents reality. Citing Kothari and Warner (2006) again, the issue is
summed up by their statement:

While the specification and power of a test can be statistically determined,
economic interpretation is not straightforward because all tests are joint
tests. That is, event study tests are well-specified only to the extent that
the assumptions underlying their estimation are correct. This poses a
significant challenge because event study tests are joint tests of whether
abnormal returns are zero and of whether the assumed model of
expected returns (i.e. the CAPM, market model, etc.) is correct.

The correct (or most correct) model is a contentious issue, and often different
models offer particular advantages and inevitable shortcomings. In this regard, the
proper model may be more an issue of which assumptions and limitations a researcher
is willing to accept.

2.5.2 The Market-adjusted, Market, and Fama-French Three Factor Models
The market-adjusted model is by far the simplest and most intuitive model for
normal returns. As the name suggests, it is built on the assumption that the return of a
company should be the return of the market. Therefore, abnormal returns are just the
diff     

 

            

This model has the advantage of being direct and simple in its assumptions. However, it
could be critiqued for being too simple. The model lacks complexity or adjustment for
risk, and most researchers and investors believe that risk drives returns. Therefore, the
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assumption that all companies should receive the return of the market in a specified
time period is not considered very realistic.
As an alternative, the market model presented by (Brown & Warner, 1980) is an
attractive alternative to the shortcomings of the market-adjusted model. Indeed, the
market model is cited as the most frequently used model for calculating normal returns
(Strong, 1992). Using a pre-event estimation window it estimates a beta representing a
stocks reaction to movements in a market portfolio. In this manner it acts to capture
returns driven by company risk. The notable problem with this, however, is the strong
assumption that a stock will behave in a static manner to market movements. This is
increasingly less valid over longer periods of analysis.
One of the biggest developments in normal return modeling came in the form of
the FammaFrench three-factor model (Fama and French 1993). By using three
variables to account for both the tendency of small cap and low price-to-book ratio
stocks to outperform the market, they provided another method to calculate the normal
returns in an event study. This three-factor model has been widely praised because of
the high R-squared (Fama et al 1992). Since its inception, a number of publications have
made use of its predictive power. Others have altered it in order to account for
shortcomings it has experienced in its application globally. The model has been argued
as most appropriate only when used with consideration to local country specific factors
(Griffin 2002). Foye, Myramor and Pahor (2013) suggest a respecified three factor model
that utilizes an estimate of accounting manipulation in emerging markets. Although
noted, these amendments have not been applied to M&A analysis.

2.5.3 Regressions upon Abnormal Returns
Aside from the difficulties relating to calculating abnormal returns and selecting
a normal returns model, there exists an increasing amount of literature seeking to elicit
the drivers of abnormal returns using OLS regressions. These publications differ from
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traditional event studies in that they regress upon the abnormal returns reported by the
normal return models employed. Although event studies typically test whether
abnormal returns are significant enough to reject the null hypothesis of non-zero
returns, it usually does not try to directly link these abnormal returns to industry, deal,
or company characteristics. Regressing upon the abnormal returns directly allows
certain factors thought to be driving abnormal returns to be more definitively tested
and is more detailed in the aim to analyze M&A transactions.
One such paper showcasing this analysis is provided by Felix Magnusson and
André Lindberg (2013). Their paper focuses on cross border transactions of Swedish
firms and evaluates how payment methods impact abnormal returns using OLS
regressions. Interestingly, they find positive returns to bidding firms are significant when
the method of payment utilizes a stock option. However, when reviewing target
abnormal returns their study did not conclude a preference on payment options.
A clearer insight into M&A abnormal return drivers is provided by Meinshausen,
and Schiereck (2011). Their paper covers 192 transactions in the European fashion
industry. Using the market model and a three day event window, they find significant
abnormal returns to acquirers. They then regress the calculated abnormal returns on
financial and transaction variables to further analyze the deals. The regressions they
report show consistent statistical significance regarding an ac  ROE and market
capitalization. Not surprisingly, deal value and a binary variable measuring the
competition surround the deal were also significant. The process of using OLS
regressions to identify key drivers of abnormal return may be an exciting pursuit, but it
unfortunately builds another layer of assumptions on an already complex analysis.

2.6

Conclusion

A number of publications exist that examine the returns of both target and
acquirer shareholders. The general consensus of these papers have held that target
shareholders benefit from transactions while acquirer shareholder experience negative
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or insignificant returns. This paper seeks to answer whether these generalizations apply
to niche food and agribusiness based companies as well.
In addition to evaluating these transactions and the returns they provide to
shareholders, the analysis performed in chapter six seeks to elicit drivers of returns and
quantify their impact. This paper intends to test, verify, and build upon the conclusions
of prior literature regarding M&A transaction. Furthermore, it intends to focus on the
food and agribusiness sectors specifically.
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CHAPTER 3.

DATA COLLECTION SUMMARY

The data gathered for this paper comes from three sources. The Thompson-one
(formerly known as SDC) database is used to identify the merger and acquisition (M&A)
transactions for analysis. Thompson-one also provides information about key deal
attributes and allows querying of transactions according to attributes selected by a user.
The database is a starting place for many studies looking to research large business
transactions and often supplemented with other business data sets. The Center for
Research on Security Price (CRSP) and the Compustat dataset are used in this study to
accumulate additional information regarding the companies and M&A transactions
selected. Compustat provides substantial financial information for companies in the
years before and after a transaction, but lacks the observation count for strong analytics.
Therefore, its role in this research paper is secondary to conclusions drawn from
Thompson-one and CRSP data.

3.1

Thompson One / SDC Database

The Thompson-one database is set up to allow users to query lists of merger and
acquisition transactions by several attributes. The database lists details and dates of
many business events dating back over thirty years. Eight query criteria are used to
identify the transactions analyzed in this study. This subset of observations was selected
to maximize the information available regarding the companies involved in each M&A
transaction. The criterion used are shown in Table 1. They are also listed below. The

    

     

       

      

right in Table 1. The first imposed requirement returns over 300,000 business
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transactions, but the final dataset of useable observations for this study is whittled
down to just over 200 M&A transactions. This drops slightly further according to
available data in CRSP. The eight Thompson-one criterion I use are:
1) Observations are limited to the Thompson-one M&A database.
2) Observations are limited to disclosed value M&A transactions.
3) Observations are limited to transactions with a target mid industry listed as
agriculture & livestock, food and beverage, food and beverage retailing, or
tobacco.
4) Observations are limited to transactions with an American acquiring
company.
5) Observations are limited to transactions with an American target company.
6) Observations are limited to transactions with a public acquiring company.
7) Observations are limited to transactions with a public target company.
8) Observations are limited to transactions listed as completed or unconditional.
Many of the query criteria were imposed for intuitive reasons. For example, the
industry listings were selected to specialize research into four specific food or
agribusiness sectors. Choosing to analyze only American acquirers who pursue American
targets provides a standardized market within which transactions occurred. Although
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than many foreign

markets. Thus using American companies focuses the research of this paper but rules
out the possibility significant regulation variation impacting transaction success. The
concern that varying market regulation can interact with investor returns in an event
study is evidenced in Bartholy and Flugt (2009).
The later attribute requirements, from company public status to deal status, are
applied to select transactions with sufficient data available for the event study and OLS
regressions performed in chapters 5 and 6. Table 2 shows the final variable dataset
gathered from Thompson-one. These values are also defined in Table 2. Quantitatively,
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financial variables are summarized in Table 3 while binary variables are shown in Table 4.
Several variables are not directly provided by Thompson-one but are instead created
from data provided by the database. For example, return on assets (ROA) and return on
equity (ROE) are calculated using the company data reported by Thompson One.
Relative size and the dummy variables used to identify hostile, competitive, and related
industry transactions are also generated indirectly from Thompson-one. Because of this,
some observations are dropped in later regressions when insufficient or missing data
was provided by Thompson One.
A descriptive summary of the non-binary variables mean, median, standard
deviation, minimum, and maximum values are shown in a table format in Table 3. Most
variable statistics report expected values. For example, target companies were found to
underperform acquirers on average. Furthermore, the average ROA of target firms was
lower than both the mean and median acquirer ROA. This may suggest poorly managed
companies are more likely to become targets of M&A. This notion is supported by
noting target return on equity averaged a little less than zero. Unprofitable firms may
find participating in M&A more beneficial to shareholders than continued operation.
However, overall target observations reported a broad range of values for ROE. This is to
be expected as many targets were quite small and volatile net incomes may appear
overdramatized when displayed in percentage metrics. Specifically, target ROE ranged
from a maximum value of 261% to an equally extreme negative return of -184%. The
existence of transactions with high ROE targets may indicate that companies can be
pursued for both under or over performance.
Unlike the other financial variables, statistics pertaining to relative size and
value require greater scrutiny. Because relative size is calculated using acquirer and
target sales, it is subject to some extreme results9. This phenomenon can be explained
by transactions involving companies focused on different products. A producer of a low
9

Several large relative size observations were thought to be outliers. Regressions in Chapter six were run
without them but these observations were re-added after their impact was not deemed significantly
detrimental or errant.
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turnover, high margin product acquiring a producer of a high turnover, low margin
product would have an inflated transaction size. The definition of relative size in this
paper is meant to be a proxy of company market size and deal risk but is subject to
shortcomings. Other measurements of size have similar shortcomings as companies may
have value in intangible assets or be financially structured differently according to their
industry, making comparison a prevalent challenge for other considered metrics.
Reviewing the transaction values at which deals were made, the data lists a mean value
of $1,030.73 million. This value seems to be inflated by several large transactions. This
can be inferred from the smaller median of $164.38 million, larger standard deviation of
$2,914.80 million, and minimum observation of $1.26 million.
Table 4 highlights the binary variables used in the OLS regressions. Again the
observations are broken into industry, payment, and deal characteristic groups with the
observation counts listed to the right. The counts are the number of transactions that
identify as having the variable be listed as true. These variable groups are identified to

       

               

vary by particular attributes of the transaction. It should be noted that the deal
characteristics have been tailored to this study. Hostile observations are transactions
identified by Thompson-one as being such. Competitive transactions are transactions
with greater than three bidders and are used to designate competitive deals. Lastly,
related industry transactions are deals where both acquirer and target companies share
the same Thompson-one mid industry classification.
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Table 1: Thompson-one Querying List
Query Criteria
Request
1 Database
2 Deal Type
(Code)
3 Target Mid
Industry (Code)

4 Acquiror Nation
(Code)
5 Target Nation
(Code)
6 Acquiror Public
Status (Code)
7 Target Public
Status (Code)
8 Deal Status
(Code)

Operator
Include
Include

Description/Code
All Mergers & Acquisitions
Disclosed Value M&A

Count
n/a
305658

Include

18511

Include

Food & Beverage Retailing
Agriculture & Livestock
Food and Beverage
Tobacco
United States of America

Include

United States of America

3500

Include

Public

1754

Include

Public

271

Include

Completed
Unconditional

206

4072

Table 2: Thompson-one Variable Definitions
Variable
Value of Transaction
($mil)
Acquirer ROA
Target ROA
Target ROE
Relative Size

Definition
The value of the transaction in millions of dollars

Acquirer Net Income / Acquirer Total Assets
Target Net Income /Target Total Assets
Target Net Income/ Target Equity
A transaction size proxy using Target Sales LTM/ Acquirer Sales
LTM
Industry Dummy (x3) A binary variable dependent on the targets industry (Ag, Food
& Bev, Food & Bev Retailing)
Payment Dummy
A binary     
        
(x2)
of stock or cash.
Hostile Transaction
A binary variable denoting whether the transaction was hostile
Competitive
A binary variable denoting whether there were three or more
bidders for a target company
Related Industry
A binary variable denoting whether the acquiring and target
company where listed in the same Thompson One industry
category
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Table 3: Thompson-one Variables Non-binary Summary
Summary
Statistic
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Standard
Deviation
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Count

Value of
Transaction ($mil)
1030.73
211.46
164.38
2914.80

Relative
Size
1.25
0.48
0.23
5.91

Target
ROA
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.18

Acquirer
ROA
0.05
0.00
0.05
0.06

Target
Roe
-0.01
0.03
0.03
0.39

5.49
25051.16
1.26
25052.41
190

10.02
67.69
0.00
67.70
151

-2.44
1.75
-1.07
0.67
171

-1.53
0.44
-0.24
0.20
156

0.50
4.45
-1.84
2.61
172

Table 4: Thompson-one Binary Variables Summary
Industry

Obs.
Out of
190
17

Agriculture &
Livestock
Food & Beverage
89
Retailing
Food and Beverage 79

Payment
Consideration
100% Cash

Obs.
Out of
190
75

Deal
Obs.
Characteristics Out
of 190
Hostile
9

100% Stock
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Considerations 42
>3
Related
123
Industry

3.1.1 Selected Transactions & Data Trends
The analysis of this paper focuses on transactions in four industries: Food and
Beverage, Food and Beverage Retailing, Agriculture and Livestock, and Tobacco.
Acquiring companies were not constrained to any particular industries, but target
companies were restricted to one of these four. This approach ensured adequate
observations while still maintaining a food and agribusiness focus. The breakdown of
each company purchases by each industry is shown in Figure 3. Figure 5 shows the
company sales of each industry. By comparing the two graphs it is clear that more public
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purchases of companies were made by agriculture and livestock companies than there
were sales of companies in the industry. The same is true of tobacco, which listed two
sales and six purchases. Food and beverage had twenty-two more industry sales than
purchases. Food and beverage retail had a less significant disparity between sales and
purchases of 19. Only 29 transactions with companies operating outside of the four
identified industries purchased public food and agribusiness firms. This represents
approximately 15% of all transaction and suggests that most M&A occurs among firms
in closely related industries.
Figure 4 and 6 are similar to 3 and 5, but display the value of the purchases and
sales in each industry. One particularly important attribute worth noting is the
substantial dollar value the tobacco industry represents given the low sales count. This
is visible in Figure 3. For having only two transactions, over 15% of the total sales value
belonged to the sale of two tobacco companies. Furthermore, tobacco companies held
35% of total purchase value. Agricultural transactions appear to have close to the same
percentage of total value as observation count. Food and beverage companies had
greater valued transactions on average since the industry had only 42% of the total
number of sales transactions in Figures 3, but 50% of the sales value in Figure 5. Food
and beverage retailing, however, had almost 50% of the sales transactions but only 24%
of the cumulative transaction sales value. This is also demonstrated by their lower
purchase count, and purchase value in figures 4 and 6 respectively.
Table 5 and Figure 7 show the historical waves of M&A transactions in the
United States and provide a basis for evaluating the scope and limitations inherent in
  






Table 5 displays the number of transactions in a given year, the

   

compared  

      

      

   

    

 



transaction value compared to the cumulative total value of $195,839 million. Several
years are worth noting due to the substantial number of transactions that occurred (see
1996-1998) or because of the value of the transactions (see 2000 and 2014).
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Historically, there have been five identified waves of company mergers and


 







 











  

 

  



sixth, and contentious seventh wave. These waves are not particular to the food and
agribusiness sector but are nonetheless visible in Table 5 and Figure 7. Figure 7 displays
the number of public and private transactions in food and agribusiness during the years
of this paper. The fifth wave (1993-2000) is clearly seen as transaction counts peak
during the mid-90s before returning to lower numbers. Figure 7 was generated using
transactions reported in Thompson-

 







 



 

  

transaction of the period. The focus on the purely public segment of the overall
transaction population shown in Figure 7 has been discussed, but the intention has
always been to maximize the available data and transparency in each transaction.

Count of Transaction Purchases by Industry
29

25

6

Agriculture &
Livestock
Food & Beverage
Retailing
58

72

Food and Beverage

Tobacco

Other

Figure 3: Count of Transaction Purchases by Industry
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Value of Transaction Purchases by Industry
10989.13, 6%

11972.347, 6%

40696.792, 21%
Agriculture & Livestock

68989.532, 35%

Food & Beverage
Retailing
Food and Beverage

Tobacco
63191.618, 32%
Other

Figure 4: Value of Transaction Purchases by Industry
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Count of Transaction Sales by Industry
2, 1%

17, 9%

Agriculture &
Livestock
Food & Beverage
Retailing

80, 42%

Food and Beverage
Tobacco
91, 48%

Figure 5: Count of Transaction Sales by Industry

Value of Transaction Sales by Industry
33362.642, 17%

17280.582, 9%

48030.179, 24%

Agriculture &
Livestock
Food & Beverage
Retailing
Food and Beverage
Tobacco

97164.758, 50%

Figure 6: Value of Transaction Sales by Industry
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Table 5: Transaction Observations by Year
Row Labels

1978

Count of
Sum of Value of
Percent of Total
Percent of
Date
Transaction
Total Value
Announced
Count
2
749.434
1.1%
0.38%

1980

1

78.996

0.5%

0.04%

1981

3

1082.584

1.6%

0.55%

1982

3

551.6

1.6%

0.28%

1983

5

619.104

2.6%

0.32%

1984

5

1532.956

2.6%

0.78%

1985

6

5408.9

3.2%

2.76%

1986

10

1154.905

5.3%

0.59%

1987

5

895.48

2.6%

0.46%

1988

12

5169.335

6.3%

2.64%

1989

5

210.31

2.6%

0.11%

1990

3

42.05

1.6%

0.02%

1991

4

1899.3

2.1%

0.97%

1992

4

1762.088

2.1%

0.90%

1993

3

22.245

1.6%

0.01%

1994

9

2528.308

4.7%

1.29%

1995

6

659.055

3.2%

0.34%

1996

13

4889.358

6.8%

2.50%

1997

18

9263.074

9.5%

4.73%

1998

14

15213.229

7.4%

7.77%

1999

7

5520.819

3.7%

2.82%

2000

13

59106.023

6.8%

30.18%

2001

7

5792.425

3.7%

2.96%

2003

2

313.577

1.1%

0.16%

2004

2

1859.787

1.1%

0.95%
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Table 5: Continued
2005

1

34.248

0.5%

0.02%

2006

4

3602.029

2.1%

1.84%

2007

5

12743.294

2.6%

6.51%

2008

2

2355.172

1.1%

1.20%

2009

4

4433.756

2.1%

2.26%

2010

1

1162.527

0.5%

0.59%

2012

2

5598.839

1.1%

2.86%

2013

2

2861.17

1.1%

1.46%

2014

7

36723.442

3.7%

18.75%

190
5.6

195839.419

100.0%

100.00%

Grand Total
Average
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M&A Transactions Counts by Year, 1980-2016
160

30%

140

25%

120
20%

100
80

15%

60

10%

40
5%

20
0

0%

Private Private

Private Public

Public Private

Public Public

% Public

Figure 7: Overall Food and Agribusiness M&A Transactions by Year

LEGEND: The graph above displays the number of M&A transactions broken into four
sub segments according to the Thompson database. The four segments in the key list
the status of the acquirer in a transaction followed by the targets status. According to
this key, the gray bars at the top that are labeled Public Public represent public
acquirers who perform transactions with public targets. The gray line represents the
percent these transactions reflect the total M&A count in a given year. Four years have
had a thicker outline applied to indicate a recession.

3.1.2 Transaction Value & Value Groupings
The transactions studied in this paper are grouped based on industry, value, and
size. Industry groups are created using Thompson-one industry classifications, but
transaction value and relative size grouping are created using careful analysis and
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author discretion. Table 6 shows the size classifications and the number of observations
that fell into each category. The ranges of each size category were determined using
Figures 8, 9, and 10. The groupings were largely aligned with changes in the rate of deal
value to observation percentile.
Figure 8 displays the transaction deal value over the percentile of all
observations in this study. Transactions in the final category are shown above the
highest solid line in the graph and consist of seven transactions ranging from $5,000 to
just under $25,000 million dollars. Roughly 70% of transactions were under $500 million.
As is evident in the Figure 8, these transactions are drastically larger than the majority of
observation deal values.
Reviewing Figure 9, the third category of transactions is now shown as the
highest tier. Although it was already clear from Figure 8 that observations in the
medium value grouping were reporting significantly higher deal values than the other 70%
of observations, the difference is more strongly noted given the adjusted axes. Likewise
Figure 10 shows the axes adjusted again to highlight changes in the value to percentile
rate of the data. The bottom tier held 40% to the transactions with deal values not
exceeding 100 million.

Table 6: Categories by Value
Value Category
Very Low
Low
Medium
High

Transaction Value
(millions)
0-100
100-500
500-5000
5000+

Number of Transactions
77
58
48
7
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Percentiles Over Observation Deal Values- All Transactions
100.00%
90.00%

Transaction Percentile

80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

20000

Value of Transaction (Millions of Dollars)
Percent

Very Low | Low

Low | Medium

Medium | High

Figure 8: Observation Value over Percentile  All Transactions
The graph above shows observation percentile over deal value. Using the graphics 14-16
and author discretion, four transaction value groups are defined; very low value, 0-100;
low value, 100-500; medium value, 500-5000; and high value acquisitions exceeding
5000 million.
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Percentiles Over Obsevation Deal Values - Deals Less than 5000
Million
100.00%
90.00%

Transaction Percentile

80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

Value of Transaction (Millions of Dollars)
Percent

Very Low | Low

Low | Medium

Medium | High

Figure 9: Observation Value over Percentile  Transactions Less than 5000 Million
The graph above shows observation percentile over deal value. Using the graphics 14-16
and author discretion, four transaction value groups are defined; very low value, 0-100;
low value, 100-500; medium value, 500-5000; and high value acquisitions exceeding
5000 million.

5000
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Percentiles Over Observation Deal Values - Deals Less than 500
Million
70.00%

Transaction Percentile

60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

Value of Transaction (Millions of Dollars)
Percent

Very Low | Low

Low | Medium

Medium | High

Figure 10: Observation Value over Percentile  Transactions Less than 500 Million
The graph above shows observation percentile over deal value. Using the graphics 14-16
and author  discretion, four transaction value groups are defined; very low value, 0-100;
low value, 100-500; medium value, 500-5000; and high value acquisitions exceeding
5000 million.

3.1.3 Relative Size & Relative Size Grouping
The third attribute by which transactions are grouped in this study is relative size.
It is calculated using the last twelve months of sales of the target company over the
sales of the acquirer for the same time period. The intent of this metric is to calculate
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the riskiness of a transaction. Ideally, this will also help to identify transactions that have
a market structure or market share impact. For example, a company that acquires a firm
with the same total sales would be participating in a transaction that is likely more risky
and perceptively different than a large firm that acquires a small firm with a small
comparative total sales value. The first firm would be more likely to have to finance the
acquisition and the impact of the transaction would be much more noticeable both in
  



   

  

  

Sales have been chosen to approximate the relative size of the transaction, but
this method is not without limitations. As previously mentioned, the transactions size
can be distorted when companies focused in different markets or on different products
interact. Any company that generates its net income through a large volume of low
margin sales will appear inflated when compared to a high margin low volume producer
and vice versa. If the data were readily available, company stock would probably be the
best measure to compare a target to an acquirer. Capital assets, net income, and other
financial aspects are not used because, like sales, they can vary by industry, product, or
short run company performance and are thus also subject to distortions.
Table 7 displays the number of transactions within each relative size group. The
data has been broken into three categories. The smallest group includes all transactions
  

 

  



  

 

     



transactions in this group is roughly double that of the other two. Following the format
of Figures 8-10, Figure 11 shows the percentiles over the reported relative sizes of the
transactions. The changes across relative size are not as distinguishable as they were in
the deal value graphics of figures 8-10. Furthermore, not all transactions are displayed
with the axes of figure 11. Approximately 8% of transactions reported a relative size
value greater than 200%.
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Table 7: Relative Size Categories
Relative Size Category

Relative Size

Number of Transactions

Low Relative Size

0-25%

80

Medium Relative Size

25-75%

39

High Relative Size

75%+

32

Deal Relative Size vs Percentile
100%
90%
80%

Transaction
Observation
s

70%
60%
50%

Low |
Medium

40%
30%
20%

Medium |
High

10%
0%
0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

Figure 11: Relative Size over Percentile

Similar to transaction value groupings, relative size categories are made by author 
discretion after reviewing the graph above. Relative size has been broken into low risk,
0-25% sales increase; medium risk, 25-75%; and high risk, 75%+.

3.2

CRSP / Eventus Databases

The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) provides the necessary stock
history and market data to perform the event studies used to evaluate M&A
transactions in this paper. CRSP has data available for most publicly listed companies in
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the AMEX, Nasdaq, and NYSE stock markets. CRSP also offers indexes for the evaluation
of stock returns relative to certain market sector movements.
Eventus is a software program that pulls data from CRSP to allow users to
perform event studies quickly and easily. Using a selected normal returns model,
abnormal returns can be calculated within Eventus. Eventus allows abnormal returns to
be aggregated according to user preferences, but the general format Eventus reports
abnormal returns and statistical testing in is consistent. This format is similar to that of
Table 8. The specific methods to calculate the aggregated abnormal returns are listed in
Table 8 as well as the significance tests used to test abnormal returns in this paper. The
actual process of aggregating returns and testing is discussed in the methodology
section.
Figure 2 was initially presented in the literature review and displays a graphical
elaboration on how event studies are conducted. It is now revisited to highlight the
specific CRSP stock market data Eventus pulls to compute abnormal returns. The Figure
consists of three windows. The estimation window identified by the time period L 1 is
used to estimate parameters. Normal return models like the market model use prior
stock data, OLS regressions, and estimated parameters to calculate normal returns
during the event window. The event window, L2, is the time period during which
abnormal returns are calculated. The event, in the case of this paper the announcement
of an M&A transaction, occurs at time T=0. Figure 2 has been tailored to display the long
and short run time specifications of this paper in Figures 12 and 13. These figures are
presented in the methodologies section, but the stock price data pulled by eventus is
discussed in the following paragraphs.
Regarding short run event studies, the estimation window for a company in the
event studies performed in chapter 5 require a minimum of 30 days to a maximum of
225 days of prior stock price data. This window is used to estimate the beta coefficients
of the market model discussed in 4.1.1 of the methodology chapter. The OLS estimation
regressions are restricted to using only market data in the period 30 days prior to the
event. The event window is composed of the abnormal returns calculated during the

51
sixty days surrounding the event. This paper lists six windows, but focuses on the (0-1)
day period. Statistical tests are included and vary for short and long run event studies.
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) calculated in the paper are subjected to
back dating. This means transactions announced during market closures are instead
dated back to the nearest market business day. For example, transactions announced on
weekends or holidays would have CAR calculations start the day before the market
closure and then skip to the next opening of the market for the window (0-1). The
process of backdating is included to allow for the inclusion of two transactions that were
announced on a Sunday as well as any transactions that may have occurred before a
holiday or other market closure. Furthermore, the 0-1 window allows CAR calculations


 







 







 





announcement. This window is advantageous because, although the date a transactions
is announced is known, the time of the announcement is not available in Thompson one
data. Transactions, then, may be announced after the market closes and thus the day of
  

  

   

     

The long run event studies of this paper require monthly data for a minimum of
6 months prior to the month before a transaction. A maximum of 36 months data is
allowed during the estimation window. The event windows for long run studies in this
paper, requires 37 additional months market price observations. This requirement
reduces the number of observations available for long-run analysis.
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Table 8: Eventus Report Format
Event Window

Observations
available For
this Window

Event Study
Abnormal Return

The time
period over
which
abnormal
returns are
calculated.
Listed as
(T1,T2).

Lists the
number of
observations
N for a given
time period.

Listed as either
Cumulative
abnormal Returns
(CAR) for short run
studies, or
Compounded
abnormal returns
(COAR) for long.

3.3

Positive vs.
Negative
Return
Observations
The number of
positive CAR
or COAR
observations
to negative
observations.

Significance
Tests of
Abnormal
Returns
The Patell Z,
Generalized
Sign Z, and
skewness
corrected T test
are used and
discussed in the
methodology
section.

Compustat Database & Company Financials

Compustat is a database that provides information regarding company financials.
Using it, many changes in performance metrics during the years surrounding a
transaction can be obtained. However, the number of companies for which data is
available is rather limited. Because of this, Compustat financial information is not used
in regression analysis. However, the availability of seven years financial information for

   

 in M&A transactions provides insights too valuable to dismiss. In

order to add value to the long run analysis of impacts M&A has on acquirer performance,
the Compustat dataset is analyzed.
Table 9 displays many company financial metrics available on Compustat. Given
the low observation count, the inferences of the data in the table should be taken with
caution. The figure does not show individual company performance, but rather displays
the percent of the 55 companies for which each financial ratio increased during the time
period listed at the top. Multiple time periods are compared using different spans of the
seven years of financial information available. The transaction year is listed as zero in
the table headings. This table will be revisited as a supplement to the long run acquirer
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conclusions of the paper, but it should be understood that its findings are subject to
limitations beyond just observation count.
Data available on Compustat is more common for larger, North American
companies. Thus the conclusions drawn from Compustat data may be representative of
only this population. Many of the event study transactions include lower valued firms
that may have deals not accurately reflected by the fifty-five companies in the
Compustat database. Furthermore, in order to have seven years financial data the
companies in Compustat are inherently biased to reflect only transactions that did not
cause fatal impacts. This may cause financial metrics to appear to be more improved.

Table 9: Compustat Financial Performance Improvement Table
Financial Ratio

Definition

- 1 to 0

-1 to 1

Current Ratio

Current Assets /
Current Liabilities
Profit Before Interest
and Tax / Average
Capital Employed
Profit after Tax /
Total Assets
Profit after Tax /
Sales
Total Debt / Total
Assets
Interest / Profit
Before Interest and
Tax
Sales / Average Total
Assets
Current AssetsCurrent Liabilities
Net Income / Equity

43%

41%

- 3 to 0
vs. 0 to 3
Averages
63%

38%

36%

59%

45%

39%

63%

43%

36%

70%

66%

66%

70%

63%

66%

73%

32%

34%

55%

46%

50%

66%

54%

45%

63%

Return On Capital
Employed
Return On Assets
Net Profit Margin
Total Debt Ratio
Interest Coverage
Ratio
Asset Turnover
Ratio
Working Capital
Return On Equity
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CHAPTER 4.

4.1

METHODOLOGY

Event Study Windows and Models

This paper makes use of two normal return models to calculate the abnormal
returns of its event studies. The first is the market model. The second is the marketadjusted model. Short-run studies rarely differ greatly in the abnormal returns reported
using these models. In long-run studies, additional assumptions made in the market
model can lead to significantly different abnormal returns from the market adjusted
model. Table 10 highlights the variables and notations of the models presented in 4.1.1
and 4.1.2.
The normal models used are presented in the next two sections, but the specific
time frameworks used for long and short run event studies are presented first. These
windows are used in tandem with normal return models to calculate abnormal returns
that occur during the event window. Figure 12 and 13 display the specific windows over
which abnormal returns are calculated. The time periods used were briefly discussed
during the data section and shown again in Figures 12 and 13. Reiterated, the windows
in the short run are calculated using daily data. In the long run, monthly observation
prices are used. One exception to the timeline shown in Figure 13 occurs. In one case
detailed in chapter 5, all windows are pushed back an additional 6 months in order to
examine company performance before a transaction.
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Table 10: Notation Table for Normal Returns
Notation

Definition

ARjt

The abnormal return for company j at time t

Rjt

The real return for company j at time t

E(Rjt)

The expected real return for company j at time t

Rmt

The market portfolio return at time t

t

Unique company conditions impacting return

t

Portfolio responsiveness to changes in the market portfolio

jt

Error term in an OLS regression for observation of company j at time t

t1 or t2

Two unspecified moments of time

Figure 12: Short Run Event Study Timeline
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Figure 13: Long Run Event Study Timeline

4.1.1 The Market Model
The most popular method for calculating normal returns is the market model.
This model is outlined mathematically in Brown and Warner (1980) using the notation
below.

          

Equation 1

Here E(Rjt              !

" #$% &j  'j are model parameters estimated using OLS regression and a
previously decided estimation window. Rmt is the return on the benchmark index. The
value Rmt is provided by Eventus and is the change in the AMEX, Nasdaq, and NYSE

   #(  #  # %) *%+      , jt is included at the end
of the equation. Once the normal returns for every company j and day t have been
calculated using the above model, abnormal returns are calculated using the equation
below.

-     . /  0

Equation 2

!# #% %%# (#"  #  $1       %
return and the value of the return as estimated by the market model. Its difference is

  $ %  
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4.1.2 Market-Adjusted Model
The market-adjusted model is the simplest model available for calculating
abnormal returns. It is incredibly intuitive and its abnormal returns are merely the
difference between a given stock Rjt      

  

mt. No OLS

regressions or parameters are needed in its calculation.
       

Equation 3

The simplicity of the market adjusted model and its lack of strong assumptions
make it appealing to many researchers. Unlike the market model, there is no
assumption of a static time insensitive company characteristic. Performance relative to
 

      

4.2

    

Abnormal Returns

4.2.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns CAR
There are two commonly used measures of aggregated abnormal returns. These
measures are useful for statistical testing of abnormal returns. The first is found by
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 "  1 and t2, a cumulative abnormal return can

be calculated by summing the abnormal returns between the two moments. By doing
this over the different periods, cumulative abnormal returns for multiple event windows
can be calculated. This is mathematically represented below.

Equation 4
# $%& ' (  )'%  
The cumulative abnormal returns in this paper are tested for significance using
the Patell test and generalized sign z test.
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4.2.2 Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns BHAR
Similar to cumulative abnormal returns, buy and hold abnormal returns are
calculated over a time period t1 to t2. However, unlike cumulative abnormal returns, buy
and hold abnormal returns are compounded over the time period analyzed. These
returns are considered to be more reflective of investor experience in the long run.

   



         

Equation 5

Simply stated, buy and hold abnormal returns are the difference between the
realized buy-and-hold returns and the normal buy-and-hold return of a portfolio Rmt.

4.3

Statistical Tests on Returns

Three statistical tests are used to test abnormal returns calculated in the market
and market adjusted models. The Patell Z, generalized sign Z, and skewness corrected T
test are used to identify whether abnormal returns are significantly non-zero. The Patell
and skewness corrected tests are parametric tests. The Patell is used on short run CAR
returns, while the skewness corrected is used to test long run abnormal returns. The
generalized sign Z is a non-parametric test. It is also reported for long run windows.

4.3.1 The Patell Test Statistic
The Patell test is arguably the most prevalent parametric test for abnormal
returns in event study literature (Patell 1976). The standardized residual test, often
referred to as the Patell t-test, tests the null hypothesis that the cumulative average
abnormal return is equal to zero.
The test statistic is shown below:




 

Equation 6

Here, ASARt is the sum over the sample of standardized abnormal returns and
SASARt is the standard deviation of those abnormal returns. Boehmer, Musumeci and
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Poulsen (1991) elaborate on the Patell statistic and show that, given the lack of an
event-induced variance increase, the Patell test is well specified and has appropriate
power. However, they find that 

  







  



 

event date, the standardized residuals test rejects the null hypothesis too often.

4.3.2 The Generalized Sign Z Test
The second test used is the generalized sign test proposed by Cowan (1992). This
test uses the null hypothesis that, under the assumption of no abnormal returns, the
number of stocks with positive abnormal cumulative returns would be similar to the
fraction of positive cumulative abnormal returns from the estimation period of the
study. When the number is significantly higher, the null hypothesis is rejected and the
event is said to have had an impact on the returns of the stock.
The generalized sign test statistic developed by Cowan (1992) is shown
mathematically by:
 




Equation 7

where w is the number of stocks in the event window for which the cumulative
abnormal return is positive and n is the number of stocks. Furthermore
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Equation 8

where mi is the number of non-missing returns in the estimation window for event i and
Sit assumes either the value 1 or 0 depending on if the firm experiences positive
abnormal returns during the period. The generalized sign Z statistic mentioned is best
applied to short run studies and is not advised over longer event studies without severe
discretion.
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4.3.3 The Skewness Corrected T Test
    

               

The null hypothesis tested of no abnormal returns is tested using the statistic:
  !

,  "#$%& 0 1
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Equation 9

where ABHAR(h) is the sample mean of BHARi(h)s, and SBHAR is the sample standard
deviation of BHARi(h) over the n sample of firms. The characters i and h represent the
individual BHAR returns for event windows of h months. Lastly, 2    3   
skewness coefficient of BHARi(h). The skewness corrected T test is included in long run
analysis, but is subject to a number of shortcomings. Therefore, the inferences drawn
from it should be cautiously reported.

4.4

Regressions on Returns

This paper attempts to find the factors that influence abnormal returns of
acquirers and targets in the food and agribusiness industries through two primary
methods. First, the event studies are grouped using industry, size, and value subsets.
Each subset is tested using the Patell and generalized sign z test statistic. The variations
in the subsets are used to justify exploration into driving factors of abnormal returns
according to industry, size, deal value, and several other transaction attributes.
Three sets of OLS regressions are performed on the abnormal returns of
acquirers in the short run, targets in the short, and acquirers in the long run. Variables
from Thompson-one are included in the OLS regressions. Their significance is tested
with the intent of identifying and quantifying impactful drivers of return. Three
regression models, each with different variable sets, are presented and performed on
each set of abnormal returns. For clarity, the regression models have been labeled as
variable sets A, B, and C. The dependent variable is the CAR of short run acquirer or
target firms as calculated using the market or market adjusted model. However, in the
regressions of acquirer firms in the long run, the dependent variable switches to the
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BHAR as calculated by the market or market adjusted model. Table 11 displays the
variables and sets. A     
  

     



   

     

   

. Asterisks denote variables used in target regression

sets A, B, and C. The first five variables in Figure 24 are continuous and the last 8 are
binary variables. Equation 7 lists a general mathematic notation of the OLS regressions
performed. The symbol  denotes the error term in each OLS regression.
Y = B0 + B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3   nXn 

  



Simplicity, intuition, and exploration motivate the three variable sets used in the
OLS regressions of Chapter 6. Variable set A includes only the continuous variables
thought to impact transactions. Variable set B was developed according to the
conclusions of Chapter 5 and the significance cash transactions have held in other
studies identified in the literature review. Variable set C is used to explore other
possible driver. Of the three sets, set B will be the focus of many of the conclusions
derived in this paper.
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Table 11: OLS Regression Variable Sets
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CHAPTER 5.

EVENT STUDY RESULTS

The event study results of this paper suggest statistically significant market
       



This is true for both acquirer and target

shareholders. Market and market adjusted event study abnormal returns remain very
similar in the short run but deviate in the long run. The short run abnormal returns also
display an accumulation of abnormal returns in the days leading up to the transaction,
particularly for target companies. Both acquirers and targets received positive average
cumulative abnormal returns in the 0-1 event window. Acquirers did not have positive
mean compounded abnormal returns in the long run.
The short run abnormal returns of acquiring and target firms will be analyzed
individually in sections 5.2 and 5.3, but a general overview of the short run returns in
both the market and market adjusted models is provided first. A list of descriptive
statistics for the abnormal returns of targets and acquirers in both models is shown in
Table 12. Multiple event windows and their abnormal returns are discussed in sections
5.2 and 5.3. The differences in reported abnormal returns between the normal return
models in the short run are addressed in section 5.5. Long run abnormal returns are less
easily analyzed than their short run counterparts and are addressed in their own section
-- 5.4.

5.1

General Short Run Results

Concerning the short 0-1 day event window shown in Table 12, target and
acquirer cumulative abnormal return (CAR) values differ drastically in their spread and
range. This is observed from the maximum and minimum CAR values reported by either
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model for the target and acquirer firm subsets. The difference is further shown by the
large standard deviation of target returns compared to acquirers. The mean for
acquirers is slightly positive, hovering just over 0.5% for the CAR of both the market and
market adjusted return models. However, targets were found to have a mean CAR
exceeding 17%, a positive value. Both acquirer and target short run abnormal returns
displayed positive skewness. This can be seen from the larger mean values compared to
the medians or by looking at the reported skewness levels. Overall, the CAR values
reported are similar to the returns of other studies.
Figure 14 displays a list of all the transactions and the weekday they occurred.
Announcements made on Fridays or before holidays provide additional time for
investors to process and develop their perceptions given a 0-1 event window. Thus
these transactions may be different than those that occur at the beginning or midweek.
However, these transactions are included because Friday was the second most popular
announcement day and removing these observations would have drastically dropped
the observations available in the event study. No sizeable trend was found in the
months of announcement. The range of announcements per month is between 12 and
22 but averages just over 15. The number of transactions in each particular month is
shown in Figure 15.
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Table 12: Summary Statistics of Short Run Returns
Descriptive
Statistic
Mean
Standard
Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Count

Acquirer
Market Model
CAR
0.96%

Acquirer
Target
Market
Market Model
Adjusted CAR
CAR
1.04%
17.70%

0.58%
-0.22%
4.36%

0.58%
-0.21%
2.24%

1.67%
13.59%
10.13%

1.66%
13.76%
9.15%

7.60%
0.987
62.72%
-27.25%
35.47%
186

7.60%
0.943
61.73%
-26.52%
35.21%
186

20.06%
0.816
125.56%
-28.17%
97.39%
148

20.01%
0.787
123.73%
-27.52%
96.21%
148

Transaction Announcements by Days of Week
Transaction Announcements
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52
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40
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35
30

30
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17.64%

Monday

Tuesday
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Figure 14: Transactions By Day of Week

Friday
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Transactions Announcements by Month
Number of Transactions
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15
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5
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Month

Figure 15: Transactions By Month

5.2

Acquirer Short Run Event Study Results

Figures 16 and 17 display the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the

                      
announcement. Table 13 displays the cumulative abnormal returns as well as the Patell
and generalized sign z statistical test for several event windows within these sixty days.
These tests are performed against either the null hypothesis that abnormal returns
should be zero or that the number of firms experiencing positive abnormal returns is
significantly divergent from the market. Table 13 includes the ratio of firms reporting
positive to negative cumulative abnormal returns for each event window analyzed.
Investors often speculate on transactions prior to their announcement (Figures
16 and 17). On average, these expectations are optimistic as transactions are predicted
to create more value for the average acquirer than destroy. This is visible from the slight
upward slope of the cumulative abnormal return lines in both the market and market
adjusted models. Given the assumption that these models accurately reflect the normal
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value generation of a transaction as speculated by the market. In the market model, this
value generation appears to occur as a roughly 2.5% increase in cumulative average
abnormal returns over sixty days surrounding the event. The market adjusted model
reports a slightly larger CAR of roughly 4%. These returns are not tested but are
indicative of positive speculation before an announcement and positive expectations
  

 

 

      

The results of the event study process are shown in the event windows of Table
13. The last three windows are for the day of the announcement, day after an
announcement, and both days combined. The window including the day of the
announcement does not include two weekend transactions. Backdating in this case
      







   

  

       s

returns would be calculated. The day of the event is not statistically significant. The day
after the event is, however, significant for the Patell test at the 0.001 level. The
combined days are significant at the 0.05 level. The abnormal returns these tests are
analyzing is listed in Table 13 but are observable in Figures 16 and 17 by the immediate
jump that occurs at the y-axis. Figures 16 and 17 have other jumps in their axis that may
be due, in part, to larger market movements that occur over weekends. It is not easy to
remove this effect without restricting the analysis to only transactions that occur on the
same weekday and are not backdated.
Although all windows report positive abnormal returns, the bottom three
windows report a larger number of negative observations than positive observations.
This implies that, although the average cumulative abnormal return is positive for an
announcement, investors perceive most transactions to be value destroying. Given the
positive average cumulative abnormal return of all transaction, transactions with
positive CARs are often larger in absolute value than transactions that experience
negative CAR.
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Market Adjusted Acquirer Returns - 60 Day
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Figure 16: Market Adjusted Acquirer Returns  60 Day Window Graphic
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Market Model Acquirer Returns - 60 Day Window
10% Graphic
8%
MM Cum Ab
Returns

Returns

6%
4%

MM Abnormal
Returns

2%
0%

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

-2%
-4%

Days

Figure 17: Market Model Acquirer Returns  60 Day Window Graphic
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Table 13: Acquirer Short Run Abnormal Return Windows
Acquirer Short Run Abnormal Return Windows
Market
Model
Positive vs.
Cumulative

Negative

Observation

Abnormal

Return

Patell

Generalized

Window

Count

Return

Observations

Test

Sign Z

(-15,+15)

186

1.82%

97:89

0.679

1.478$

(-5,+5)

186

0.99%

97:89

1.216

1.478$

(-1,+2)

186

0.79%

89:97

0.799

0.303

(0,0)

184

0.05%

88:98

0.107

0.157

(+1,+1)

186

0.91%

82:104

2.787***

-0.726

(0,+1)

186

0.96%

89:97

1.976*

0.303

Market
Adjusted
Positive vs.
Cumulative

Negative

Observation

Abnormal

Return

Patell

Generalized

Window

Count

Return

Observations

Test

Sign Z

(-15,+15)

186

02.6%

104:82

0.921

2.480**

(-5,+5)

186

1.34%

102:84

1.551$

2.186*

(-1,+2)

186

0.91%

87:99

1.124

-0.018

(0,0)

184

0.13%

87:99

0.533

-0.018

(+1,+1)

186

0.90%

85:101

2.663**

-0.312

(0,+1)

186

1.04%

91:95

2.260*

0.57
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5.2.1 Acquirer Returns by Size, Value, and Industry
Further analyzing the 0-1 event window, Figure 31 displays the returns of
acquiring firms according to the attributes by which transactions from Thompson-one
were grouped. The market and market adjusted model CARs are both shown, but the
statistical tests apply only to the market model. This model is preferred in the short run
      



 

  

   



 



instead of just the return of the market. The two models provide very similar results for
most observations and cases of significance for one model are almost always true for
both in the short run.
The first subsection of Table 14 displays the observations according to the
transaction value groups in which they were categorized. The table lists the average CAR
of the group for the market and market adjusted models. The largest transaction value
group reported a particularly high mean cumulative abnormal return and was
statistically significant at the 0.001 level for the Patell test and the .05 level for the
general sign z test. However, there are only seven observations in this group, so the
results should be taken with caution. The smallest valued transactions were statistically
significant at the 0.05 level for the Patell test and averaged a cumulative abnormal
return of roughly half what was reported for the largest value group. Low and medium
valued transactions were not found to be significant in any manner. Medium valued
transactions were the only group to report negative average CAR.
By industry, several sectors were found to be significant. Particularly, food and
beverage retailing reported a positive market model average cumulative abnormal
return of 2.49% for 82 transactions. It was statistically significant for the Patell test at
the .001 level. Food and beverage companies reported a negative market model mean
cumulative abnormal return of .62% for a similar sized observation count but the CAR
values were only significant at the .05 level. The sole tobacco observation was
significant, but the lack of other observations makes generalizing the results to the
industry as a whole an ill-advised venture.

72
The last category of observations had a lower number of observations as data
was not available for all transactions. Only high relative size transactions were
significant, averaging a market model cumulative abnormal return of 2.04%. The returns
reported a significance levels of .01 for the Patell and 0.1 for the generalized sign z test
statistic. The total for all the observations in the event window of 0-1 days is shown at
the bottom of Figure 31 but was already presented in Figure 30.

Table 14: Acquirer Abnormal Returns By Group  0-1 Day Event Window

Rel. Size

Industry

Value

Acquirer Abnormal Returns By Group: (0-1 days)
Group

N

MAR

MM

Patell Z

Sign Z

Large

7

4.05%

3.95%

3.983***

1.955*

Medium

45

-0.53%

-0.62%

-1.263

-0.194

Low

54

0.53%

0.57%

0.639

-0.272

Small

73

2.02%

1.86%

1.912*

-0.149

Ag

16

0.32%

0.40%

-0.458

-0.655

F&B Ret

82

2.71%

2.49%

4.451***

0.097

F&B

79

-0.65%

-0.62%

-2.092*

0.031

Tobacco

2

2.21%

2.28%

2.276*

1.465$

High

30

2.15%

2.04%

3.017**

1.340$

Medium

37

-0.20%

-0.18%

-0.482

-0.55

Low

77

0.47%

0.43%

-0.012

-0.701

Total

186

1.04%

0.96%

1.976*

0.303

5.3

Target Short Run Event Study Results

Figures 18 and 19 display the average abnormal and average cumulative
abnormal return of targets for the market and market adjusted model during the sixty

   

 

  nnouncement. Likewise, Table 15 displays the
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cumulative abnormal returns, positive to negative observation ratios, Patell statistic,
and generalized sign Z statistic for several event windows during this sixty day period.
Unlike acquirers, the returns for targets are particularly large and significant.
Taking a closer look at Figures 18 and 19, a difference between the abnormal
returns for targets compared to acquirers is apparent. For example, the cumulative
   



            

apparent. Furthermore, the largest jump in abnormal returns clearly occurs on the day
of and the day after a transaction. Abnormal returns are largest on the day of the
announcement and cumulative average abnormal returns level off almost immediately
after                      
relatively transparent value  the price of the deal value. Again, this shift occurs over
two days in the graphs because transactions may be announced on weekends or too
late in the business day for market adjustments to occur.
Looking at Table 15, there are several important results that should be
highlighted. All windows were significant for both the Patell and generalized sign Z test.
The observation count for the window consisting only of the day of the transaction
drops as two observations occur on Sunday and backdating would not capture the
impact of the event for this period. Lastly, the most significant Patell statistic occurs on
the 0-1 window.
Again, attention should be drawn to the number of positive to negative
observations for each event window. For targets, the ratio is particularly significant.
However, according to the models employed, there are still targets who received
negative abnormal returns in every window analyzed. Reasons for negative target
abnormal returns are discussed in section 5.5. Still, during the 0-1 window only 22 of a
148 transactions had negative cumulative abnormal returns. This highlights the notion
that target shareholders rarely suffer from participating in transactions.
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Figure 18: Market Adjusted Target Returns  60 Day Window Graphic
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Figure 19: Market Model Target Returns  60 Day Window Graphic
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Table 15: Target Short Run Abnormal Return Windows
Target Short Run Abnormal Return Windows
Market
Model
Positive vs.
Cumulative

Negative

Observation

Abnormal

Return

Patell

Generalized

Window

Count

Return

Observations

Test

Sign Z

(-15,+15)

148

25.12%

131:17

21.015***

10.402***

(-5,+5)

148

20.68%

127:21

30.800***

9.907***

(-1,+2)

148

18.90%

127:21

45.228***

9.742***

(0,0)

146

12.79%

119:27

58.632***

8.633***

(+1,+1)

148

5.08%

87:61

25.792***

3.474***

(0,+1)

148

17.70%

126:22

59.531***

9.247***

Market
Adjusted
Positive vs.
Cumulative

Negative

Observation

Abnormal

Return

Patell

Generalized

Window

Count

Return

Observations

Test

Sign Z

(-15,+15)

148

25.31%

135:13

20.629***

11.061***

(-5,+5)

148

20.61%

127:21

30.266***

9.741***

(-1,+2)

148

18.82%

127:21

44.814***

9.741***

(0,0)

146

12.79%

119:27

58.484***

8.631***

(+1,+1)

148

05.02%

87:61

25.392***

3.143***

(0,+1)

148

17.64%

126:22

59.151***

9.576***
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5.3.1 Target Returns by Size, Value, and Industry
The statistical significance of CARs for target groups during the 0-1 event window
is clearly shown in Table 16. Almost every group was significant at the 0.001 level. For
this reason, most differences in this section come from looking at differences in the
extremity of test statistic significances for each group instead of just general significance.
As previously noted these test statistics are performed against the null hypothesis that
no abnormal returns occur during the event window.
Looking at the transaction value groupings of Table 16, the largest test statistic
was reported for medium valued transactions. This was true for both the Patell and
generalized sign z test statistic. Large valued transactions were the least significant,
reporting the least positive mean cumulative abnormal return. This group also only had
six observations to test. Interestingly, small transactions reported average cumulative
abnormal returns roughly double large transactions and approximately 8% less than low
or medium valued observations.
Industry groupings were again all extremely significant. Food and beverage
transactions were most statistically significant for the Patell and generalized sign z,
while the singular tobacco observation was least significant for both tests. The food and
beverage industry also reported the highest average cumulative abnormal returns of
any industry. Agriculture and food and beverage retailing trailed by less than 5%.
By relative size, medium and low grouped transactions both reported average
cumulative abnormal returns of approximately 20%. Low valued transactions were the
most significant for both statistical tests. High relative sized transactions scored the
lowest values across the board, reporting only a 13.05% mean cumulative average
abnormal return.
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Table 16: Target Abnormal Returns by Group  0-1 Day Event Window

Rel. Size

Industry

Value

Target Abnormal Returns by Group: (0-1 days)
Group

N

MAR

MM

Patell Z

Sign Z

Large

6

6.58%

6.75%

7.827***

1.773*

Medium

45

21.64% 21.77% 53.667*** 6.123***

Low

46

20.59% 20.76% 35.825*** 4.965***

Small

51

12.74% 12.63% 14.297*** 4.680***

Ag

13

15.53% 15.63% 16.952*** 3.182***

F&B Ret

71

16.02% 16.06% 33.407*** 5.922***

F&B

63

20.08% 20.15% 47.727*** 6.304***

Tobacco

1

6.00%

High

25

13.05% 13.12% 15.311*** 3.521***

Medium

32

20.00% 20.24% 35.905*** 3.815***

Low

64

20.10% 20.14% 42.360*** 6.381***

Total

148

17.64% 17.70% 59.533*** 9.247***

5.4

5.96%

2.818**

1.095

Acquirer Long Run Event Study Results

5.4.1 Acquirer Long Run Event Windows
The results of long run event studies are more complex than short run results.
Their interpretation and the conclusions suggested from their analysis may not reflect
reality for a number of reasons. Joint test problems as well as changes in companies,
markets, and economies make the accuracy of normal returns difficult to maintain over
longer time periods. The abnormal returns reported by a study have been argued to be
more driven by the normal return model employed than by the actual impact of the
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event. This difference is most notably seen in the mean compounded abnormal returns
of Table 17.
As with the prior two sections, there are multiple windows shown in Table 17.
However, this time, the windows assume values between -6 to 36 months after a
   













     



buy and

hold compounded returns for acquirers during each window. The generalized sign Z and
skewness corrected test are displayed, but should not be given much weight for longer
windows. The issues with these tests as well as the overall problems associated with
long term models were discussed in depth during the literature review.
Specifically focusing on the first two windows, there is a notable trend in average
abnormal returns. In the months prior to a transaction, the market and market adjusted
models report positive abnormal performance. These abnormal returns are significant
for both the -6 to 0 and -1 to 0 windows according to the generalized sign Z and
skewness corrected tests for the market adjusted model. The market model reports
significance for both tests at the 0.05 level for the -1 to 0 window and significance at the
0.1 level for the skewness corrected t-test during the -6 to 0 month event window.
Lastly, it should be noted that the -6 to 0 month window displays fewer observations as
the timeline had to be moved back an additional 6 months to accommodate this
window and not all observations had data available to meet the requirements discussed
in Chapter 3.
The statistical significance of longer windows is not widely mentioned as it is
increasingly less reliable. The market adjusted model calculates abnormal returns as the
difference between the return of a stock and the return of the market. Therefore, the
mean compounded abnormal return for the -1 to 36 month window of -7.63% for all
transactions indicates companies who participate in M&A transactions underperform
the market in the long run. Even without concrete statistical testing, this result suggests
a negative impact of M&A. This idea is strengthened by the strong abnormal
performance prior to the transaction as shown in the -6 to 0 window. In fact, these
results would be 
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inefficiency and value loss as managers are incentivized to perform detrimental
transactions (1986). However, the implied assumption in the market adjusted model is
  

that 







  

    



  



  

    

            

If the

majority of stocks in this analysis are low risk, comparison to the market over three
years might not reflect the true value being received by investors as little consideration
is given to the security of the investment. However, this explanation seems to contradict
the strong outperformance of the firms prior to the transactions announcement.
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Table 17: Acquirer Long Run Abnormal Return Windows
Acquirer Long Run Abnormal Return Windows
Market
Adjusted
Mean
Observation Compounded

Positive vs.
Negative

Generalized Skewness
Sign Z

Corrected

Count

Ab. Return

Observations

(-6,0)

134

10.15%

78:56>

1.833*

3.980***

(-1,0)

140

6.55%

81:59>

1.687*

4.137***

(0,+6)

140

4.35%

80:60)

1.518$

1.824*

(0,+12)

140

1.10%

66:74

-0.849

0.291

(0,+24)

140

-3.90%

62:78(

-1.525$

-0.622

(0,+36)

140

-14.17%

50:90<<<

-3.554***

-1.679*

(-1,+36)

140

-7.63%

56:84<<

-2.539**

-0.78

Mean

Positive vs.

Window

Market
Model

Observation Compounded
Window

Negative

Generalized Skewness
Sign Z

Corrected

Count

Ab. Return

Observations

(-6,0)

134

4.94%

70:64

1.227

1.469$

(-1,0)

140

5.18%

76:64>

1.699*

2.595**

(0,+6)

140

-3.92%

56:84<

-1.688*

-1.365$

(0,+12)

140

-17.62%

49:91<<

-2.873**

-3.422***

(0,+24)

140

-81.91%

47:93<<<

-3.211***

-3.989***

(0,+36)

140

-346.13%

40:100<<<

-4.397***

-2.205*

(-1,+36)

140

-387.22%

40:100<<<

-4.397***

-2.073*
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5.4.2 Acquirer Market Model Returns by Size, Value, and Industry
Focusing specifically on the market adjusted model of compounded abnormal
returns (COAR), there is a wide array of reported value generation. For example, large
transactions reported a mean compounded abnormal return of over 20%, while low
valued transactions reported an almost equally negative result. Small valued
transactions were close to zero, implying the mean compounded abnormal return for
companies involved in these transactions appears to be very close to the return in the
market.
Regarding the industry sub segments, tobacco no longer has any observations
with three years of post-transaction data. Agriculture shows market adjusted abnormal
returns close to 16%. Food and beverage retailing reports very negative and significant
mean COAR. Food and beverage transactions list a positive mean compounded
abnormal return of 6.29%. The abnormal returns shown in this section may be related
more to industry booms and busts than M&A transactions. This would certainly explain
the immense range, and consolidation has historically aligned with strong and weak
economic states.
The last section of Table 18 shows the long term abnormal returns by relative
size. The largest relative size transactions reported the largest mean compounded
abnormal returns. Low relative size transactions reported a negative mean compounded
abnormal returns of approximately 12%. These results may reflect the higher risk higher
reward nature of the market. Relative size is calculated by target and acquirer sales, and
thus the returns these sub segments have may be driven by this calculation. Low relative
size transactions may be composed of mostly large, established companies acquiring
small firms. In contrast, observations with high relative size values may reflect smaller
riskier business ventures.
Overall, the acquirer companies involved in transactions underperformed the
market by -7.63% over the roughly three year period compounded returns were
calculated. This result does not support the idea that M&A creates value, but it does not
necessarily refute the notion. The companies observed may be experiencing lower
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returns for industry or risk reasons. To strengthen and provide further meaning to the
long run returns of acquirers, Chapter 7 provides an analysis of long run performance of
companies involved in M&A transactions.

Table 18: Acquirer Abnormal Returns by Group- -1-36 Month Window
Acquirer Abnormal Returns by Group: (-1 to +36 Months)

Rel. Size

Industry

Value

Group

Skew

N

MM

MAR

Gen Z

Large

5

11.31%

20.74%

-0.343

0.517

Medium

31

-84.59%

-11.60%

-0.843

-1.018

Low

42

-131.40%

-18.28%

-1.475$

Small

62

-743.97%

-0.71%

-1.910*

-0.038

Ag

12

-40.47%

15.88%

1.094

0.843

F&B Ret

65

-746.11%

-24.90% -3.098***

F&B

62

-82.54%

6.29%

-0.955

0.403

High

20

-108.09%

14.12%

-1.605$

0.374

Medium

31

-67.69%

6.96%

-0.347

0.396

Low

61

-110.22%

-11.97%

-2.009*

-1.196

Total

140

-387.22%

-7.63%

-2.539**

-0.78

T

2.205*

2.097*
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5.5

Model and Return Comparison and Discussion

5.5.1 Market Model to Market Adjusted Model
Figures 20 and 21 show the market and market adjusted model cumulative
abnormal returns for acquirer and target observations respectively. The market model
abnormal returns are displayed using the xaxis and market adjusted abnormal returns
are captured by the y-axis. A 45 degree line has been added to show that neither model
appears to consistently over or under predict the abnormal returns compared to the
other during the 0-1 day window.
    

         

most clearly seen by the correlation of their returns. Regarding the acquirer abnormal
returns shown in Figure A, a correlation of .997 was found between the returns
reported by the market model to those reported by market adjusted model. This
correlation is even stronger for target abnormal returns, which reported a correlation
value of .999 for the two models.
Although these correlations are very high, it should be understood that these
models deviate from each other quite quickly as the event window length increases. The
market model predicts normal returns using prior stock price movements, which may
not reflect the company as accurately over longer periods of time. In contrast, the
    

        compared

to the general market. To assume a particular stock should bear the same risks and
returns of the market over longer time periods is a strong and often erroneous
conclusion. Therefore, the similarity between the abnormal returns of the market and
market adjusted model during the 0-1 window should not be generalized to longer time
periods.
Figure 22 shows the compounded abnormal returns of acquirer companies
involved in transactions in the long run. The abnormal returns are compounded over the
period of -1 to 36 months post transaction and utilize monthly data. It should be noted
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that the axes are not the same. The market model reports a number of observations at
far more extreme values over the near three year period. There are still a number of
observations that are near the 45 degree line, meaning the two models report nearly
the same return, but a substantial number of market model observations are
significantly more negative. Furthermore, the correlation between the returns of the
two models drops heavily in the long run, coming to a value of 0.589. This difference is
largely put on the market model as the compounded abnormal returns appear too large

Market Adjusted Abnormal Returns

to be reflective of reality.

Market and Market Adjusted 0-1 Day Acquirer
CAR Comparison
20%

-20%

10%

Abnormal
Returns

0%

45 Degree
Line

-10%

0%

10%

20%

-10%

-20%

Market Model Abnormal Returns

Figure 20: Short Run Market and Market Adjusted 0-1 Day Acquirer CAR Comparison

Market Adjusted Abnormal Returns
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Market and Market Adjusted 0-1 Day Target CAR
Comparison
70%
Abnormal
Returns

50%

45 Degree
Line

30%
10%
-30%

-10%
-10%

10%

30%

50%

70%

-30%

Market Model Abnormal Returns

Figure 21: Short Run Market and Market Adjusted 0-1 Day Target CAR Comparison

Market and Market Adjusted -1-36 Months BHAR
Comparison
400%

Mar

200%

-1000%

0%
-500%

0%

500%

1000%

-200%

-400%

MM

Figure 22: Long Run Market and Market Adjusted -1-36 Months Acquirer BHAR
Comparison
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5.5.2 Target to Acquirer Returns
The last two Figures (23 and 24) show the abnormal returns of acquirers and
targets for the market and market adjusted model during the 0-1 day event window.
Target abnormal returns are listed on the x axis and acquirer returns are on the y axis.
The graphs display two main trends.
First, not every target has positive abnormal returns. Because only public
transactions are being evaluated, the target stock price should be reflective of the
  

   

 

       



 

cumulative stock value. It would seem reasonable that a premium should be payed to
incentivize targets to sell, always leading to positive abnormal returns. These negative
CAR may be the result of prior speculation by investors. Well telegraphed
announcements would have a build of target stock price and may be subject to over
speculation. The announcement and certainty that comes with it would correct this over
speculation and would show as a negative abnormal return in the event window 0-1
days. This serves as a possible explanation, but it does not appear that the majority of
transactions are telegraphed as many announcement events have significantly larger
CAR for targets during the 0-1 day time period.
The second notable trend would be the drastic difference between the two


      



 

    s to help illustrate this

difference. The long drawn out observation cluster along the x axis demonstrates that
       

 

          

 



the x axis suggests the difficulty acquirers have in negotiating strongly favorable deals.
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Market Model Target and Acquirer 0-1 Day CAR
Comparison
Acquirer Abnormal Returns
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Figure 23: Market Model Target and Acquirer 0-1 Day CAR Comparison

Market Adjusted Target and Acquirer 0-1 Day CAR
Comparison
Acquirer Abnormal Returns
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Figure 24: Market Adjusted Target and Acquirer 0-1 Day CAR Comparison
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5.6

Conclusion

Multiple hypotheses were presented in chapter 1 of this paper. These
hypotheses are now revisited. The prior analysis suggests several trends occur in merger
and acquisitions of food and agribusiness firms. Each hypothesis is listed as either being
rejected or failed to be rejected. The hypotheses are numbered, with an explanation for
its acceptance or rejection following.
Hypothesis 1: Average abnormal returns in the short run are zero for acquiring
     

  

 

Results: Rejected. The positive mean cumulative abnormal return of .96% for the 0-1
day event window and its statistical significance at the .05 level according to the Patell
test suggest acquiring firms do receive positive abnormal returns on average.
Hypothesis 2: Acquirer subsets will not vary in the short run reported average
returns according to the relative size, value, and industry characteristics of the
transaction.
Results: Rejected. The positive market model cumulative abnormal returns of 3.95%
and .001 significance for large transactions, 2.49% and .001 significance for food and
beverage retailing transactions, and 2.04% and .01 significance for transactions with
high relative size values suggest certain attributes may be correlated with higher or
lower returns for acquirers in the short run.
Hypothesis 3: Average abnormal returns in the short run are zero for target firms
   

  

 

Results: Rejected. The positive mean cumulative abnormal return of 17.70% for the 0-1
day event window and its statistical significance at the .001 level according to the Patell
and generalized sign z test suggest target firms do receive positive abnormal returns on
average.
Hypothesis 4: Target subsets will not vary in the short run reported average
returns according to the relative size, value, and industry characteristics of the
transaction.
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Results: Rejected. Although every group reported positive significant values when tested
against the null hypotheses that no abnormal returns were present in the subsets, the
variance in statistical significance of CARs according to the Patell and generalized sign z
suggest the subsets vary from each other.
Hypothesis 5: Average abnormal returns in the long run are zero for acquiring
     



s announcement.

Results: Failure to reject. Given the limitations of the generalized sign z and skewness
corrected T test, the significance of returns is not considered reliable enough.
Compounded abnormal returns are reported as negative in the long run for both the
market and market adjusted model, but the dataset studied only underperforms the
market by 7.64% over three years.
Hypothesis 6: Acquirer subsets will not vary in the long run reported average
returns according to the relative size, value, and industry characteristics of the
transaction.
Results: Rejected. Using only the compounded abnormal returns reported by the market
adjusted model for each group, there is substantial variation in returns. However, these
returns may not be directly related to the transactions. Positive returns in the market
adjusted model for the food and beverage industry compared to large negative returns
in food and beverage retailing suggest the industries are different.
These hypotheses provide an initial foundation for the impact of M&A. Chapter 6
and 7 will further develop the analysis of M&A transactions in food and agribusiness.
Furthermore, these chapters will use more specific characteristics and test particular
variables for significance. Focus will be on determining the exact impact variables have
on returns and whether performance in the long run is favorably impacted
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CHAPTER 6.

OLS REGRESSIONS ON ABNORMAL RETURNS

Abnormal returns by group were the focus of discussion in chapter 5, and the
statistical tests employed have tested the null hypothesis that abnormal returns are
zero. From the results of chapter 5, it can be ascertained that certain groups do
experience significant non-

  



     

announcement. This is most evident from the cumulative abnormal returns of target
firms. Overall, Chapter 5 suggests that both acquirer and target shareholders benefit
from M&A transactions on average.
It seems that certain segments of the acquirer and target observations
experience uniquely significant average abnormal returns. To explore the drivers of
these abnormal returns and quantify their impact, OLS regression analysis is performed
in the following chapter. The OLS regressions use the decimal form abnormal returns
calculated in chapter 5 as dependent variables. The independent variables are also in
decimal form, thus their coefficients are understood as the impact on returns should the
variable increase or decrease by 100%. Dividing this coefficient by one hundred gives
the percentage change a 1% increase has on abnormal returns. The coefficients of
dummy variables 





    

     

returns. The deal value variable is measured in millions of dollars.

6.1

Acquirer Short Run Return OLS Regressions & Models

Figure 25 shows six OLS regressions. The figure can be divided into two normal
model sections, each with three variable set regressions. The dependent variable in the
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regressions is either the market model or market adjusted CAR during the period 0-1
day event window 

  

 

   

   

     

of each variable as well as the p-value of their statistical significance are listed.
Significant variables in each model have been bolded. The variable sets were introduced
in section 4.4 of the methodology chapter. The focus of discussion will largely revolve
around the results of regressions using variable set B.
The observation count as well as the R-squared of each regression is listed below


      

 

    

 

 

   

  

intuition, or exploration. For example, regressions using variable set A are intentionally
run using only the most direct variables of this study. Regressions using variable set B
utilize variables suspected of impacting returns according to the literature review or
conclusions of chapter 5. Lastly, regressions using variable set C include a number of
additional independent variables. These regressions are used to explore other possible
drivers and observe if any major shifts occur in the coefficients or significance of other
regressions.
Reviewing regressions using variable set A in Figure 25, the only statistically
significant variables are acquirer and target return on assets (ROA). Both of these
variables are significant at the .1 level. The coefficients are the same for the variables in
both the market and market adjusted return regressions. Given how similar the
abnormal returns in each model are in the short run, this result is not surprising (see
section 5.5.1 for comparison of normal return models). This trend is true for each
market model with its paired market adjusted variable set equivalent in the short run.
Interestingly, the ROA variables of acquirer and target firms have negative
coefficients and 0.1 level significance for almost every regression in Figure 25. Given the
decimal form of ROA variables in the data, a negative coefficient on target ROA values
suggests acquirers of more poorly managed assets will not feel as strong an impact from
the negative coefficient. For example, if a target firm had an ROA near zero the negative
coefficient would be negligible in the regressions prediction of abnormal returns. Larger
        

bnormal returns for the acquirer. Remembering
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the summary of variable ranges, standard deviations, and means first presented in table
3, it is important to understand the impact these variables may have on returns. Target
ROA had a mean value of .01 and standard deviation of .18, while Acquirer ROA had a
mean of .05 and standard deviation of .06. At their mean levels, the predicted impact
each has on abnormal return is very small. The large standard deviation of target
variables coupled with its range of 1.75 suggest that it may be very impactful in
determining return. Acquirer ROA has a much smaller standard deviation and no
reported observations with greater than an absolute value ROA of .25.
Targets with lower ROA values may penalize acquirer returns less as it may be
perceived that there are larger opportunities for value to be generated from better
utilizing the assets purchased. All other things held constant, negative ROA values in
target companies would correspond with larger abnormal returns in acquirers given the
negative coefficient in Figure 25. This would align with the ideas presented by Beitel and
Wahrenburg (2002) where transactions involving poorly managed targets hold greater
value generation potential.
The regressions using variable set B include only the variables most suspected of
being influential drivers. This model also reports the most number of statistically
significant variables. The value of the transaction is significant at the .1 level and the
coefficient is positive, suggesting the greater the value of a transaction the more likely
the abnormal returns experienced will be positive. As with models 1 and 4, ROA
variables have negative coefficients and remain significant. Target ROA, however, has
become significant at the .05 level and the coefficient is slightly more negative. The
dummy variables representing a transaction in the food and beverage retailing industry
and a cash transaction have positive coefficients and statistical significance at the .1
level. Furthermore, their impact on abnormal returns is more intuitive. A transaction in
this industry or paid for with cash is suggested to have a 2 or 3% higher cumulative
abnormal return in the market or market adjusted model respectively.
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The last two regressions, 3 and 6, report the highest R-squared values. This is not
a particularly surprising result as they regress on variable set C, the largest variable set.
Model 3 reports only target ROA as a statistically significant variable, and lists it at
the .05 level. Acquirer ROA reports too big a p-value to be statistically significant at
the .1 level in model 3 but drops down to significance in model 6. Target ROA is again
significant at the .05 level in model 6. These are the only significant variables for
regressions 3 and 6.
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6.2

Target Short Run Return OLS Regressions & Models

Reviewing Figure 26, the regressions for target abnormal returns for both the
market and market adjusted model are again shown in the format presented in Figure
26. Overall, the models estimating the target returns report a higher R squared for each
variable set regressed upon than for their acquirer counterparts. The variable sets have
remained the same with the exception that acquirer ROA has been dropped as a
variable. It does not seem reasonable to regress using a variable inherent to an entity
outside the target firm and transaction. All other variables have been retained in their
sets.
It is immediately apparent that the variables significant in predicting abnormal
returns for targets are not the same as those that were significant for acquirers. With
the exception of the simplest variable set, only dummy variables reported significance in
target regressions. Models 1 and 4 report relative size of the transaction as significant at
the .1 level. The coefficient is negative, implying transactions where the acquirer is of
similar size offer lower returns to targets. This may be indicative of lower premiums
acquirers are will to offer given the higher risks that may be associated with transactions
of this nature. Besides relative size, the constant in these models is positive and
significant at the .001 level. This significance is maintained at the .001 level for all
models except the largest regressions 3 and 6. It is not reported significant in models 3
and 6.
Models 2 and 5 regress using variable set B. Again, regressions using this variable
set report the most number of statistically significant variables. Variables measuring
whether the transaction was hostile and competitive were significant at the .1 level.
Both of these variables had positive coefficients, driving abnormal returns up by 19 and
8 % respectively. Cash transactions had an increase of 9% in abnormal returns
associated with them and were significant at the .05 level. Models 2 and 5 had a .001
statistically significant constant. The reported constant value was 15%, an approximate
7% drop from the value reported in regressions 1 and 4.
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The kitchen sink models reported only one statistically significant variable.
Hostile transactions had a 21 to 22% increase in abnormal returns for models 3 and 6.
This variable was significant at a higher level than reported in any other model, dropping
below the .05 threshold. The value of the transaction variable was notably close to
dropping below the .1 level and is the only other variable with a mentionable small pvalue. The kitchen sink models shown in regressions 3 and 6 did report the highest Rsquared of the variable sets regressed on targets.
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6.3

Acquirer Long Run Return OLS Regressions & Models

As previously mentioned, there is some doubt as to whether the abnormal
returns of the market model and market adjusted model accurately reflect the actual
impact of a transaction on a firm in the long run. With this understanding, the results of
OLS regressions upon these returns should be taken cautiously.
As with section 6.1, six regressions are presented in Figure 27. The prior sections
used OLS regressions on CAR returns, and significance mainly varied according to the
variable sets regressed upon. Long run returns use BHAR as a dependent variable and
variable significance appears to be most impacted by the normal return model
employed in the BHAR calculation. Looking at the market model regressions, the
variable set A regression has three instances of statistical significance. The value of the
      

    





  

ROA is significant in all three market model regressions, often at the .05 or less level.
High valued transactions may provide better opportunities for companies to
control markets or capitalize on economies of scale. The negative constant aligns with
the common narrative that transactions generally destroy value. Reviewing the
coefficient on acquirer ROA, the strong negative value coefficient is rather unexpected.
The implication of this is that acquirers with higher ROA suffer lower abnormal returns.
This could perhaps be indicative of managerial optimism when pursuing an acquisition.
The market model uses past performance to predict abnormal returns. A company
operating very efficiently who acquirers a significant amount of new assets may make
the assumption it can continue to operate at prior levels of efficiency, but not achieve
this in reality.
Given this narrative 

   

 

  





the assumption that certain performance would be maintained. If this performance did
not occur, the transaction could represent an over expenditure and negatively impact
the actual returns experienced by company investors. Alternatively, this coefficient
 

    





   

 



   

flush time period may have its ROA drop significantly. Unless the company is able to
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quickly reinvest a large inflow of excess cash, it could be reasonably suggested that cash
would begin to represent a larger portion of total assets in a company. Even under the
best circumstances a company cannot hope to get significant interest returns from its
cash holdings, so excess cash in otherwise efficient companies would actively disguise
itself as a sign of poor performance. Since lower ROA companies are less adversely
affected by the strong negative coefficient of the acquirer ROA variable, this possibility
provides an explanation for an otherwise unintuitive result.
Reviewing the market adjusted model, no variables remain significant. This is
somewhat surprising since the model compares the returns of a company to the returns
of the market. Since no variables remain significant, it could be suggested that the
   

  



 

    

 



in predicting the abnormal return of a company three years later. As many of our
transactions were small in value or small in relative size, they may not be defining
influences to the returns of an acquirer over such a long time period.
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6.4

Regression Comparisons and Discussion

As previously stated, the three regression variable sets have been presented for
simplicity, intuition, and exploration. Comparing the three models across windows and
return models bring to light several trends that add support for the conclusions each
individual normal returns model reports. Their differences also shed light on their
limitations, particularly regarding the long run regressions using market and market
adjusted abnormal returns.
The short run regressions using target and acquirer abnormal returns align with
each other almost exactly according to the regression variable sets used. The similarity
   

        

  

      

announcement. The regressions on the abnormal returns experienced by acquire



reported more significant continuous variables. Target abnormal return regressions
marked binary variables as being significant drivers of abnormal returns. It does not
appear that target returns were greatly impacted by t 

 

 business

performance. Many of the binary variables in the target regressions represent deal
characteristics that are not directly controllable or influenced by targets. Target
regressions reported higher R squared values, although all models did not exceed a
decimal R squared value of .2.
Lastly, the differences in significant variables were most notable when
comparing long vs short run regressions. Long run regressions report a general lack of
significance and the returns themselves may be dubious. The divergence between
similarity in the market and market adjusted model appear to cause some variables to
lose or gain significance. Many of the abnormal returns and their implications in long
run analysis should not be taken without further support.
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6.5

Conclusion

Of the three regression variable sets, the rejection or failure to reject of
hypotheses will reflect the results of variable set B regressions. The hypotheses were
first presented in Chapter 1. They are restated below along with an explanation for their
rejection or failure to reject.
Hypothesis 7: Acquirer abnormal returns are not significantly impacted by
industry.
Results: Rejected. The food and beverage retailing industry was significant at the .1 level
for the short run regression models 2 and 5 of acquirer regressions. It was associated
with a 2-3% increase in abnormal returns of acquirers. Industry was not included in the
reported target regressions and was not found significant in test regressions.
Hypothesis 8: Acquirer and target abnormal returns are not significantly
impacted by relative size of the transaction.
Results: Fail to reject for acquirers and targets. Relative size was not significant for any
OLS regressions performed on target market and market adjusted abnormal returns for
variable set B. Furthermore, it was only significant at the .1 level. Given these
conclusions, it does not seem likely that relative size has a linear relationship to
abnormal returns.
Hypothesis 9: Acquirer and target abnormal returns are not significantly
impacted by deal value of the transaction.
Results: Reject for acquirers. Fail to reject for targets. Deal value was statistically
significant for the return of acquirers at the .1 level in the short run regressions on CAR
values of the market and market adjusted normal return model. Deal value was not
significant in predicting target abnormal returns.
Hypothesis 10: Acquirer and target abnormal returns are not significantly
impacted when the transac  



 

  

Results: Reject for acquirers and targets. Regressions models 2 and 5 of both acquirers
and targets reported cash transactions as being beneficial to shareholders. Although
more pronounced in targets, cash transactions were favorable to acquirers too. Cash
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transactions may be correlated with strong company performance in acquirers. Targets
may prefer cash transactions for several reasons. Cash payment allows investors to
easily reinvest according to their preference without incurring transaction costs. It may
also reflect a less risky scenario as the actual merger or acquisition may not occur until
several months following a transaction.
Hypothesis 11: Hostile transactions will not have an impact on the returns of
targets.
Results: Rejected. The hostile transaction variable was statistically significant for target
regressions at the .1 level for the short run regression models 2 and 5. It was associated
with a 19-20% increase in abnormal returns of targets in the short run. This suggests
that acquirers often pay heavy premiums during hostile transactions.
Hypothesis 12: Target abnormal returns are not significantly impacted when
multiple bidders are present.
Results: Rejected. Competitive transactions reported a 8% increase in abnormal returns
for targets in models 2 and 5. This makes sense as bidders may continue to drive up the
premium associated with the transaction, allowing targets to extract more if not all the
value in the merger or acquisition.
These hypotheses are made with consideration to short run abnormal returns.
The lack of credible significance in long run regressions make definitive statements
difficult to justify. Chapter 7 reviews financial performance of acquirers in the long run
and provides another approach to analyzing M&A in the long run.
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CHAPTER 7.

LONG RUN PERFORMANCE CHANGES

To elaborate and shed light on the impact of M&A in the long run, chapter 7
analyzes financial ratios of acquirers in the years following a transaction. Using the
Compustat data and financial performance metrics discussed in chapter 3, pretransaction company performance for 55 firms is compared to post transaction
performance. The results are not statistically tested, but display possible trends in the
financial performance of acquirers following M&A transactions.

7.1

Performance Increases or Decreases

Table 8 (displayed in chapter 3.3) shows a number of performance metrics and
their definitions. The three furthest right columns display the percent of the fifty-five
observations that had a metric increase in value over the time period -3 to 3 years. Note
that these are metric increases and not necessarily performance improvements, as a
rise in the total debt ratio is not considered a financial improvement.
Looking at the first of the three most right columns, the changes in company
performance from a year prior to a transaction to the transaction year are shown. Year
zero is the year of the transaction. Metrics reporting less than 50% show a greater
percentage of firms reporting a lower value post transaction. For example, the current
ratio, return on capital employed, return on assets, net profit margin, asset turnover
ratio, and working capital are all lower than 50% for -1 to 0 years. Interestingly, the last
column, which shows the average of three years prior transaction to the average of
three years post transaction, has each of these metrics above 50%. This suggests that
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there may be an initial hit to performance but that long run performance benefits.
Several metrics are above 50% in the -1 to 0 year time frame. Total debt ratio,
interest coverage ratio, and return on equity all have a higher percentage of firms
reporting an increase in the metrics value during the 0-1 time period. These percentages
increase in reported value over longer time periods, as indicated from the two rightmost
columns. With the exception of return on equity, however, these increasing values are

 

        

             

70% suggest that most companies take on larger debt obligations in the years following
a transaction. This would be expected in the -1 to 0 column, but its occurrence over
longer time periods suggests a detrimental effect of M&A.

7.2

Performance Metrics Over Time

The data used to create Table 8 has been graphically displayed in Figures 28-31
using individual observations. The graphs shed light on the changes in performance of
companies regarding current ratios, asset turnover ratios, total debt ratios, and return



         

         

across time, with the metrics value before a transaction shown on the x axis and its post
transaction value shown on the y axis. This allows the shift in performance for all
observations as a whole to easily be viewed and analyzed.
Looking at the first graph, Figure 28 shows the current ratio changes after a
transaction. The first thing to note is that 45 degree line shows which observations have
improved and which have deteriorated. Every point below the line has a higher prior
current ratio than post transaction. Likewise points above the line express the opposite
trend. Points on the line represent no change in reported performance. Gray dots show
a comparison the current ratio prior to a transaction to the value three years after the
transaction. Black points use three years of reported current ratios post transaction
instead of just the individual third year. Looking at the current ratios points, there are
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no strong conclusions that can be drawn. Black dots appear to be more centered on the
line, an expected result given it utilizes a three year average.
Figure 29 displays the change in asset turnover. Unlike Figure 29 several key
characteristics of the data are visible. More observations lie below the 45 degree line.
Furthermore, the further an observation lies from the origin the more likely it is to lie
farther below the 45 degree line. Intuitively, this suggests that high turnover firms that
acquire have difficulty utilizing the newly acquired assets as efficiently as it utilized its
own assets prior to the transaction. Firms that reported a lower turnover in the year
prior to a transaction still report this performance decrease but the severity is less
extreme. This is inferred from the close proximity of observations to the 45 degree line
nearer the origin.
The third graph, Figure 30, displays the total debt ratio. The results of this graph
are clearer than the prior two and suggest a more negative implication of M&A. As
evident from the graph, a majority of the observation points lie above the 45 degree line.
It is very clear that debt levels have risen for most acquirers three years after a
transaction. Most observations that are below the 45 degree line are not significantly
below it. Several transactions above the line are significantly so, and the debt level of a
number of companies have close to doubled. Although it should be expected that the
amount of debt would increase after a transaction, the company should be acquiring
assets as well. To see the debt level rise so notable and remain higher after three years
is troubling.
The last graph, Figure 31, displays the return on equity of firms in the years
before and after a transaction. This is perhaps the most troubling graph, as it shows a
rather disturbing possibility. Note that the range on the y-axis is significantly larger. In
particular, it includes far more negative values. Although a good deal of observations
surround the 45 degree line, a number of firms report a decrease in ROE following a
merger or acquisition. More concerning is the fact that the decrease appears to have
the potential to be drastically negative. Although this decrease in ROE could be caused
by a number of factors, it could be reflective of increased interest payments from larger
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debt obligations eroding income of equity holders. If this is the case M&A transactions
would be detrimental in at least some instances.
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Figure 28: Changes in Acquirer Current Ratios Graphic
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Changes in Acquirer Total Debt Ratio
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Figure 30: Changes in Total Debt Ratios Graphic
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7.3

Conclusion

The hypotheses listed below were first addressed in Chapter 1. They are not
statistically tested, but revolve around the observable trends of acquirers according to
graphical analysis. They are restated below along with an explanation for their
acceptance or rejection.
Hypothesis 13: Acquirer current ratios are decreased in the long run.
Results: Inconclusive. After reviewing Figure 28, there does not appear to be a clear
trend to changes in the reported acquirer current asset ratios post transaction.
Hypothesis 14: Acquirer asset turnover are decreased in the long run.
Results: Accepted. From Figure 29, it seems clear that asset turnover has decreased in
the years following a transaction. This is evident by the majority of observations below
the 45 degree line. It appears that larger return on asset ratios prior to a transaction are
more visibly lowered in post transaction years.
Hypothesis 15: Acquirer total debt ratios are decreased in the long run.
Results: Rejected. From Figure 30, a clear number of observations report higher debt
ratios in the years following a transaction than lower ratios. Not only are many firms
reporting larger total debt ratios, but they are reporting significantly larger debt ratios.
The post transaction values are often much higher than pre transaction. This suggests
firms are not benefitting from M&A transactions.
Hypothesis 16: Acquirer return on equity are decreased in the long run.
Results: Accepted. The motivation of M&A should be to generate larger returns for
shareholders in the long run. Unfortunately, Figure 31 suggests that most acquiring
firms did not experience increases in return on equity following a transaction. Even
more alarming, several firms experienced significant negative ROE values in the years
following a transaction. This may be caused from increase debt and interest obligations
eroding income from businesses.
The above hypotheses and their conclusions align much closer with the general
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notion that M&A destroys value for acquirers. However, this section makes the
conclusion that the three years following a transaction adequately capture the long run
impact of M&A. Strategic M&A may not provide payoffs to shareholder over the
examined period. To this extent, the above analysis is limited.
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CHAPTER 8.

CONCLUSION

The general conclusions of this paper have been broken into two segments
below. Short run conclusions and long run conclusions are addressed individually and
then discussed in relation to each other. Lastly, future research focuses and topics of
interest are suggested in the last section.

8.1

Short Run Impact of M&A  Acquirers and Targets

In the short run, M&A transactions are found to be beneficial for both acquirer
and target firms on average. Analyzing the market response to the announcement of a
transaction, non-zero positive mean abnormal returns were found using both the
market and market adjusted normal return models for both parties involved in the
transactions studied. Acquirers averaged an approximate 1% cumulative abnormal
return over the period studied, while targets reported a value nearer 17%. Although
average abnormal returns were positive for acquirers, the majority of acquiring
companies reported negative cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the
announcement of a transaction.
Deal value, acquirer ROA, Target ROA, cash payment, and food and beverage
retailing transactions were found to be statistically significant impactors of short run
acquirer returns. Acquirer and target ROA had negative coefficients while the other
three variables had positive coefficients. These returns were driven by market
perceptions regarding the deals and not their later consequences. Target ROA was the
most statistically significant driver for acquiring firms. The significance of ROA in
acquirer and target firms may suggest that investors make assumptions off asset
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performance differences between companies involved in a merger or acquisition.
Specifically, lower performing companies appear to be perceived by investors as having
large opportunities for the acquirer.
Cash payment, deal attitude, and competition were statistically significant
variables driving returns in target companies. The three variables had positive
coefficients in the OLS regressions performed. Cash transactions were most significant
while hostile transactions were associated with an increased 20% abnormal return to
target firm shareholders. Financial variables were not significant to target firms. This
suggests the negotiated terms of a deal are more likely to determine the extremity of
abnormal returns experienced by target shareholders.

8.2

Long Run Impact of M&A -- Acquirers

According to the market model, acquirer shareholders suffer significant losses in
the long run. However, joint test problems and boom bust cycles make the results of the
market model difficult to analyze. The market adjusted model suggests acquiring firms
provide shareholders mean compounded abnormal returns 7.6% less than the market
for the companies studied. This value does not factor in intrinsic company risk.
Regarding the long run financial performance ratio changes in acquirers, the
results are rather discouraging. Most clear changes in performance following a
transaction suggest a negative long run impact. Firm asset turnover ratios, debt to
equity ratios, and return on equity appear far more likely to decrease in the years
following a transaction. Return on equity particularly seems prone to drastic decreases.
This may be indicative of loss from unrealized market or performance gains made during
the negation of the transaction.
The long run analysis of chapters 6 and 7 suggest an overall detrimental nature
to M&A for acquirers. This coincides with much of the general consensus on the topic.
Still, not all transactions appear to have caused loss to shareholders. Investor optimism
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reflective of positive abnormal returns in short run analysis may be rooted in the same
ideas that prompt firm managers to pursue M&A.

8.3

Further Research

There are limitations to the research conducted in this paper. Future researchers
may wish to give consideration to multiple findings not deeply addressed in this paper
as well as explore several briefly touched topics. Lastly, future research may wish to reanalyze and revisit the conclusions of this paper pending the development of new
techniques, theories, and analytical tools.
Future research will hopefully be able to more powerful detect the abnormal
returns linked to M&A. Current abnormal returns are calculated with normal return
models that may not be sensitive enough and may be influenced by other events or
factors. Just as the CAPM model has lost much of its former prominence as a normal
returns model of event studies, new models may provide better analysis in the future.
This may already be occurring as the Fama-French three factor model increases in
popularity among researchers.

    



           

stronger statistical significance testing of long run abnormal returns. Contemporary
tests are fraught with shortcomings, leaving most of their analysis subject to skepticism.
However, unlike normal return models, there are no notable potential solutions to the
obstacle of long run abnormal return testing.
The analyses of the chapters above has cast a wide net. Reviewing both
acquirers and targets has allowed a general analysis of the food and agribusiness
industries, but future papers may wish to focus on specific populations within food and
agribusiness sector. There may be trends specific to food and beverage, food and
beverage retailing, agriculture and livestock, or tobacco firms that require a more
focused analysis. This could include a more focused analysis of specific industry
characteristics and their impact on M&A. For example, the agricultural and livestock
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industry has particular idiosyncrasies and nuances that may be worth researching.
Specifically, risks in production may impact the industry as unpredictable factors such as
droughts, diseases, and policy changes can drive industry consolidation. This extends
into food and beverage production companies as changes in competition for inputs may
prompt vertical integration of the supply chain. The unique characteristics of subsectors
may be particularly valuable to businessmen.
Lastly, a foundational set of variables impacting abnormal returns are
established in this paper, but future research may wish to test other company attributes
or deal characteristics. Better proxies for relative size may come from new datasets and
the seventh wave of M&A may provide new data points for analysis. Ideally, this paper
will be a template for future successful research.
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